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American Unicameralism:
The Structure of Local Legislatures
NOAH M. KAZIS*
The bicameral legislature is a cornerstone of the Madisonian system, a basic
assumption of American constitutionalism. But a different constitutional vision is
hidden in plain sight. Of the more than 90,000 local governments in the United
States¾many of which began as bicameral before abandoning the federal
model¾each has now chosen a single chambered legislature. Efficiency and
majoritarianism, not internal checks and balances, have driven the design of local
legislatures. Local governments are not merely smaller units than states or the federal
government; they have their own structure and their own animating principles.
Theories built on bicameralism, including statutory interpretation methodologies and
modes of judicial review, must be adapted for local, unicameral governments.

* Corporation Counsel Honors Fellow, New York City Law Department. Yale Law School, J.D.
2015. This Article reflects the Author’s views alone, and not those of the New York City Law
Department. I am grateful for insightful comments from Robert Ellickson, Suzanne Kahn, Richard
Kazis, David Schleicher, Danny Townsend, and from Nestor Davidson, Nadav Shoked and the other
participants in the Fordham International and Comparative Urban Law Conference. Thank you also
to my very helpful editors at the Hastings Law Journal.
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A single branch of Legislation is a many headed Monster which without
any check must soon defeat the very purposes for which it was created, and
its members become a Tyranny dreadful in proportion to the numbers
which compose it.1
Today here in Philadelphia, we have an autocracy due to the rigidity of the
present organization and the cumbersomeness of the city’s government
machinery.2

1. Letter from William Hooper, Delegate from N.C. to the Cont’l Congress, to the Cong. at Halifax
(Oct. 26, 1776), in 10 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1775–76 867 (William L. Saunders ed.,
1886) (quoted in John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution,
80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 770 n. 283 (2002)).
2. One Council Plan Gains in Favor, Charter Revision Along That Idea Is Indorsed Generally,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 11, 1919, at 6 (quoting Clinton Rogers Woodruff on Philadelphia’s bicameral city
council).
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INTRODUCTION
On December 16, 2013, the Common Council of Everett,
Massachusetts met for its regularly scheduled session.3 The Common
Council moved through its sixteen-item agenda in just over an hour,
performing such ordinary civic tasks as voting to accept $20 in donations
for the city’s Veterans Services Department and adopting amendments
to the zoning ordinance.4 Its meeting complete, the Common Council
never convened again.5 Neither did the Everett Board of Aldermen, which
had met the same evening.6 Effective January 2014, Everett had
abolished its bicameral legislature, replacing the Common Council and
Board of Aldermen¾established 119 years before¾with a single new City
Council.7 With that, America’s last bicameral local government was no
more.8
Our national legislature, of course, has a Senate and a House of
Representatives.9 Bicameralism is heralded as a cornerstone of the
American system of government, a hallmark of checks-and-balances
taught proudly in grade school civics.10 In the states, too, bicameralism is
also the standard. Of the fifty states, forty-nine are bicameral¾Nebraska
is the sole exception.11 From the traditional perspective of a two-level,
national/state vision of federalism,12 bicameralism appears as the
American form of legislature.
But one Congress and fifty state legislatures are only the tip of the
iceberg, quantitatively. There are more than 90,000 local governments
in the United States.13 Each and every one has a single legislative
chamber. Peering upwards from the local point of view, unicameralism
appears predominant; the few bicameral governments appear
3. Joseph Domelowicz, Jr., Zoning By-laws Updated to Match New Charter, EVERETT INDEP.
(Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.everettindependent.com/2013/12/20/zoning-by-laws-updated-tomatch-new-charter/.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Steven A. Rosenberg, Everett Finally Abandoning Its Bicameral Government, BOS. GLOBE
(Dec. 8, 2011), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/12/08/Everetts
_bicameral_government_will_become_historical_footnote_in_2014/?page=1.
8. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I.
10. See, e.g., MICH. DEP’T OF EDUC., MICHIGAN K-12 STANDARDS, SOCIAL STUDIES, AUG. 2015 DRAFT
REVISIONS
54
(2015),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mde/SS_COMBINED_August
_2015_496557_7.pdf (listing bicameralism among key terms and features of Constitution for eighth
grade history curriculum).
11. Kim Robak, The Nebraska Unicameral and Its Lasting Benefits, 76 NEB. L. REV. 791, 792
(1997).
12. See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term Foreword: Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22 (2010).
13. U.S. C ENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS tbl. 2, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY TYPE AND
STATE (2012).
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exceptional. On this most fundamental question of legislative structure,
one chamber or two, local government law has rejected the consensus of
the state and federal governments. Local government law has adopted its
own constitutional vision and this constitutional alternative has been
hidden in plain sight.
This Article provides the first sustained exploration of local
unicameralism. It fills a major gap in our understanding of the
institutional structure of local governments¾and therefore our
federalist system. As Nestor Davidson recently argued, legal scholars pay
far “too little attention to the inner workings of local government.”14
Local government scholarship has, for decades, focused on
intergovernmental relationships: in the vertical direction, local
autonomy from state control; in the horizontal direction, competition
and coordination between municipalities.15 These are important,
distinctive features of local government, whose powers are legally limited
by the states that create them, and practically constrained by city/suburb
relationships.
But local governments are also distinct in their internal structure.
For too long, courts and scholars alike have treated local governments as
“the smallest matryoshka doll nestled within increasingly larger state and
federal counterparts, with the classic tripartite structure repeated in
miniature” when, in fact, local governments are organized entirely
differently.16 Scholars understand that federal constitutional structure
has wide-ranging implications across all areas of the law. But only
recently have local government scholars turned their attention to
intra-governmental structure.17 This Article adds to that nascent
literature. Recent scholarship has looked at local administrative law,18

14. Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 570 (2017).
15. Id. at 575; see also Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897,
900–01 (2013) (most local government law “is engaged in foundational debates surrounding the role
of local governments within our state and federal constitutional structures”); Nestor M. Davidson,
Leaps and Bounds, 108 MICH. L. REV. 957, 957–58 (2010) (reviewing GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J.
BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008)) (noting that Professors Frug and
Barron set out to provide a “comprehensive, empirical look at the legal frameworks under which cities
and other local governments operate” but describing their actual subject as “home rule”).
16. Davidson, supra note 14, at 596.
17. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 14; Clayton P. Gillette, Can Municipal Political Structure
Improve Fiscal Performance?, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 571 (2013–2014); Richard C. Schragger, Can
Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115
YALE L.J. 2542, 2546 (2006) (noting, in discussion of strong mayoral form of government, that “almost
nothing has been written about the mayoralty in the legal literature”); David Schleicher, City
Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670 (2013) (explaining land use politics through lens of election law and
internal legislative processes).
18. Davidson, supra note 14.
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local election law,19 local judiciaries,20 and the various ways the
mayoralty can be structured.21 This Article turns to a different
branch¾the legislative¾and begins the work of understanding how local
governments’ distinct legislative structures affect local government law
and public law more broadly.22
At the national level, legislative structure is given its proper due.
Bicameralism stands as a pillar of federal constitutionalism, widely, and
correctly, understood to be a foundational feature of the national
government. The Framers argued vociferously for a bicameral federal
legislature. In Federalist 22, for example, Alexander Hamilton declared
that should a newly empowered federal government share with the
Articles of Confederation a unicameral legislature, it would be
“inconsistent with all the principles of good government,” and liable to
“accumulate, in a single body, all the most important prerogatives of
sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable
forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived.”23 Better,
Hamilton argued in a later publication, “to divide the legislature into
different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election
and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as
the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on
the society will admit.”24 During the constitutional convention, James
Wilson stated that a unicameral legislature would lead to “a Legislative
despotism.”25 Explained Wilson, “If the Legislative authority be not
restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be
restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent
branches.”26
Indeed, the importance of bicameralism¾both the fact of it and the
details¾led the Framers to make the “equal suffrage in the Senate” of
each state the only proviso of the Constitution that could never27 be
19. Schleicher, supra note 18, at 1699–1704; David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan
Competition in City Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419 (2007).
20. Leib, supra note 15; Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 707 (2015).
21. Schragger, supra note 17.
22. In spoken remarks at a 2004 N.Y.U. symposium, Richard Briffault called out for a new
analysis of legislative process in state and local government. Richard A. Briffault, Beyond Congress:
The Study of State and Local Legislatures, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (2003). Without drawing
any conclusions, Briffault briefly outlined a slew of differences between Congress and subnational
legislatures, offering each as worthy of scholarly understanding. Although Briffault’s call has not been
widely heeded, this Article is in many ways an attempt to take up that banner.
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton).
25. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 254 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (statement
of James Wilson, June 16, 1787).
26. Id.
27. Amendments affecting the Constitutional provisions concerning slavery were immune to
amendment until 1808. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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amended according to the ordinary procedures of Article V.28
Bicameralism was given special stature in the constitutional scheme even
compared to other fundamental structural features of the new national
government.29
Contemporary constitutional observers paint bicameralism in the
same glorious light as did the founding generation. The Supreme Court
has described bicameralism as serving “essential constitutional
functions,” and meant “to protect the people from the improvident
exercise of power.”30 Leading scholars and officials have described
bicameralism as one of “the base institutions of the Constitution,”31 part
of “the machinery of our popular form of government,”32 and a
“hallmark[] of American government.”33
But these paeans to bicameralism notwithstanding, “American
government” is not, in fact, defined by bicameralism, nor do unified
legislatures inexorably extinguish liberty and stability alike.
Quantitatively and qualitatively, unicameral governments play a
substantial role in our system of self-governance. In 2012, the country
had 3031 counties,34 all of which were unicameral.35 There were 19,519
municipalities and 16,360 towns and townships, all unicameral.36 The
nation’s 51,146 special districts serve a dramatic array of functions, but
never is a second chamber used to govern the nation’s hospital, highway,
or housing districts.37 Unicameralism, deemed “inconsistent with all the
principles of good government” at the federal level, is preferred for every
28. Id. (“[N]o state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”).
There is scholarly debate over whether this provision can be amended or evaded although practically
speaking, the Senate is not going anywhere. See Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be
Amended? 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1981); Lester B. Orfield, The Scope of the Federal Amending Power,
28 MICH. L. REV. 550 (1930); Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses,
13 CONST. COMMENTARY 107 (1996); Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution
Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21, 68–72 (1997).
29. Baker & Dinkin, supra note 28, at 21 (“The apportionment of representation in the United
States Senate has always held an exalted place in our constitutional democracy.”). Of course,
bicameralism’s status represents raw political compromise as well as principled commitment, but
principles were in play. Indeed, there was always agreement about the need for bicameralism, even if
the “Great Compromise” between large and small states was necessary to determine the
apportionment of the two chambers. Dan T. Coenen, The Originalist Case Against Congressional
Supermajority Voting Rules, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1091, 1145–51 (2012).
30. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 957 (1983).
31. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1561 (1988).
32. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 981–82 (1987).
33. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational
Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 275–76 n.6 (2001).
34. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 13, at tbl. 2.
35. TOM TODD, MINN. HOUSE OF REP., UNICAMERAL OR BICAMERAL STATE LEGISLATURES: THE
POLICY DEBATE 12 (1999), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/uni-bicam.pdf (“Local
governments in the United States all have unicameral governing bodies.”); see supra notes 7-8 and
accompanying text.
36. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 13, at tbl. 2.
37. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 13, at tbl. 9.
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local function in the country.38 Nor are those local functions
inconsequential. Local unicameral governments oversee more than 10.5
million public employees: the frontline workers in basic governmental
functions from education to law enforcement to sanitation.39 Citizens,
serving as legislators in these tens of thousands of governments, learn
the traditions and practices of unicameralism. The contrast between
constitutional conventional wisdom and the on-the-ground reality of
local government serves as the conceptual engine for this Article, its
driving puzzle.
It deeply misunderstands American government, therefore, to
elevate bicameralism to the special status it has been granted.
Bicameralism is an essential American institution. Unicameralism is an
essential American institution. It is impossible to understand American
government without understanding bicameralism, yet scholars and
courts have made the same mistake by ignoring the unicameral side of
our constitutional structure. This Article recognizes the dual nature of
our legislative institutions.
Judges have not reshaped doctrine to distinguish between
unicameral and bicameral legislatures. In the rare instances where courts
even discuss local unicameralism, it is usually because a local board was
improperly constituted as unicameral or bicameral under local law.40 In
the still-less-common cases where litigants have attempted to distinguish
unicameral legislatures on principle, the courts have not followed.41
Other scholars have noted the unicameral nature of local
government only in passing. Richard Briffault, in short spoken remarks,
has identified local unicameralism as important and unique to local
government.42 But beyond posing the question of what unicameralism
might mean, Briffault offered no answer, noting only that that “it does
change the dynamic of the legislative process.”43 As for the causes of local
unicameralism, Saul Levmore has addressed local unicameralism as part
of a short exploration of why bicameralism might be favored over
alternative forms of supermajority requirement.44 Levmore asserts that
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 23.
39. U.S. C ENSUS BUREAU, 2015 ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT & PAYROLL tbl. EP1500A3,
Local Government Employment and Payroll Data: March 2015 (2015).
40. See Lowe v. City of Bowling Green, 247 S.W.2d 386, 387 (Ky. 1952) (invalidating statute
enacted by unicameral “Common Council” after city grew to size that, under state law, required
bicameral “General Council”); Rhode Island Episcopal Convention v. City Council of Providence, 159
A. 647, 648 (R.I. 1932) (invalidating statute enacted by both chambers of city council voting in
aggregate, as single entity).
41. See, e.g., Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 613 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that
absolute legislative immunity does not depend on legislative structure).
42. Briffault, supra note 22, at 26.
43. Briffault, supra note 22, at 26.
44. Saul Levmore, Commentary, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?,
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 145 (1992). Specifically, Levmore argues that bicameralism is meant to block
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while state governments require the stopping power of bicameralism,
local governments can be checked by residents’ exit power, their ability
to vote with their feet.45 While Levmore’s analysis provides an important
kernel of insight for understanding local unicameralism, his aim is only
to sketch a simple framework for understanding state and national
bicameralism. He does not offer any empirical evidence for his
conception of local unicameralism, any additional factors driving local
governments to adopt unicameralism, or any indication of why local
unicameralism might matter.
For others, unicameralism is offered as a stand-alone data point that
helps distinguish local government from the states. Helen Hershkoff has
argued that federal justiciability doctrines are not applicable in state
courts.46 In a single sentence, she notes that local governments may be
even more different from the federal model than states, noting that,
among other things, they “may be unicameral.”47 Paul Diller, in a
wonderfully creative article asking why cities have led policy innovation
in public health, suggests as one of many reasons that local legislatures
have fewer veto points: not only are they unicameral, but they tend not
to require supermajorities to pass legislation and have a less complex
committee structure.48 Clayton Gillette, in a sustained analysis of why
local governments pursue redistribution, includes the fact that “[s]tate
legislative processes are also more likely than local ones to be
characterized by bicameral legislatures” as one variable explaining the
power of the status quo in state legislatures.49 Finally, Lynn Baker argues
that unicameral local governments are less likely to protect racial
minorities and that, as a result, her defense of state-level plebiscites
would be stronger at the local level.50

legislation enacted in haste or by small minorities without stopping too much legislation that enjoys
the support of majorities¾it is meant to help quality legislation supported by, say, fifty-five percent of
the public, to pass. Id. at 157–58.
45. Id. at 161 (“The imposition of external costs requires a captive set of losers.”).
46. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (2001).
47. Id. at 1925.
48. Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure,
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1266–67 (2014).
49. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND
THE COURTS 181 (2011).
50. Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective,
67 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 707, 716 n.21 (1991) (“To the extent that even these representative bodies are
not found to provide racial minorities better protection against disadvantageous legislation than
plebiscites, the case will be even stronger with regard to local representative lawmaking bodies.”).
Somewhat strangely, Baker also suggests that there is “no analogue of the gubernatorial veto” at the
local level, id., when mayoral vetoes are common in “strong mayor” systems. See, e.g., SEATTLE CITY
CHARTER, art. IV, § 12 (describing veto power). This is indicative of how even where scholars have
identified local unicameralism as important, local government has been an afterthought.
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These mentions of local unicameralism¾some as fleeting as one
sentence¾indicate its importance. As these scholars demonstrate,
unicameralism has implications across issue areas. But these scholars’
attention is elsewhere, and they provide no sustained investigation of
local unicameralism. This Article provides the thorough explanation of
both the causes and implications of local unicameralism that this basic
structural fact merits.
This Article proceeds in three parts. After this introduction, Part I
offers a historical perspective, laying an empirical foundation for how
both local and state legislatures took their present forms. Local
governments were not always unicameral, and state governments were
not always bicameral. Each made choices¾contested, ideological
choices¾over how to structure themselves. Returning to those moments
of contest reveals why citizens settled on the legislative structures that
now seem intuitive. With a zeal for efficiency, American cities across the
country and across more than a century¾from the mid-1800s to the late
20th century¾embraced modernization and paid short shrift to
tradition. The states, in contrast, sought the dignity of sharing a
legislative structure with the federal government and feared unchecked
legislative power.
Part II then marries those historical foundations to contemporary
theoretical understandings of local government to identify the root
causes of local unicameralism. I reject the simplest explanation for local
unicameralism that local governments are so powerless that checks and
balances are pointless. Local government wields enormous power within
its sphere of influence, and residents care deeply about its choices.
Neighbors pack zoning hearings, parents intervene in the smallest
classroom decisions, and people march and sometimes riot over police
behavior. That said, constraints on local power, whether interlocal
competition or state oversight, do provide a partial explanation of local
unicameralism: The worst-case scenarios of unchecked power are
somewhat less threatening.
But at the same time, paradoxically, local power¾particularly over
land use and education¾also explains unicameralism. At the local level,
residents sort themselves into communities with shared values and a
common (often exclusionary) political agenda. Voters want their local
governments to exercise their powers efficiently, even ruthlessly, to
defend the land use controls and school systems that define their
communities and support their property values. Unicameralism removes
the roadblocks to these popular forms of local authority.
The structure of local legislatures also reflects the executive
branches with which they interact. Local governments are
disproportionately responsible for implementation and service delivery,
as compared to policymaking, and accordingly, they are dominated by
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their executive branches. Local unicameralism is a response to executive
power. If executives control government¾and can act even without
legislative input¾legislatures must speak with one voice in order to
counteract the administration, as unicameral legislatures are better able
to do.
The executive nature of local government provides a final
explanation for local unicameralism. Local legislatures are not imbued
with great symbolic significance. While state and federal legislatures (or
local executives) are sites of civic identity, not lightly changed, local
legislatures simply are not. Local legislatures, and perhaps local
governments generally, are perceived more instrumentally.51
Local unicameralism is important in its own right¾we should
understand how our cities, towns, school districts and counties
function—but its significance ripples across the law. In Part III, I explore
how local unicameralism might affect three long-running debates in legal
scholarship. Within local government law, local unicameralism cuts
against established theories of participatory localism, which praise local
government as a site for civic engagement. Local legislatures are
designed for efficiency and instrumentalism, not participation. Those
seeking consensus and deliberation in their local governments would do
well to look outside the legislative branch. Next, widening the lens to
broad questions of statutory interpretation, local unicameralism might
allow greater reliance on legislative history. The constitutional
arguments against using legislative history do not translate to a
unicameral context. Finally, when reviewing local statutes’
constitutionality, courts should adjust their practice of judicial review to
the hyper-majoritarianism of local government. Judges should grant
greater leeway to experimentalism and policy innovation but impose
stricter oversight over exclusionary or expropriative actions.
This Article offers no definitive or comprehensive declaration of the
meaning of local unicameralism. A single fact about legislative structure
could hardly resolve such essential issues as judicial review, and
conversely, unicameralism is so foundational a fact about local
governmental structure that it surely has other implications. Necessarily,
this Article only begins a conversation it cannot conclude. Our
constitutional system, when taken as a whole, divides the work of
legislation between bicameral and unicameral governments. We must no
longer ignore the second half of that system.

51. This is consistent with the doctrinal fact that local governments are mere instrumentalities of
the state. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) (“Municipal corporations are political
subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental
powers of the state . . . .”).
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A. DEFINING UNICAMERALISM
In the local context, precisely defining unicameralism and
bicameralism proves surprisingly difficult. It is more or less obvious that
Congress is bicameral: Both the House and Senate must each act,
separately but concurrently, to pass a bill.52 However, the explosion of
local governmental forms, which rarely parallel national institutions
exactly, renders this more complex. Bicameral local legislatures need not
look like Congress and unicameral local legislatures need not look like
the House of Representatives.
First, there is not always separation of powers at the local level.53 In
weak mayor systems, the mayor is simply the first council member
among many. In council-manager systems, as in parliamentary systems,
there is no elected executive at all.54 Some entities, such as zoning boards,
perform legislative, judicial, and executive functions.55 Thus, it can be
more difficult to identify where the legislative power is exercised.
Second, while in the federal system “all legislative powers” are
granted to Congress,56 legislative powers can be disaggregated by
function at the local level. A school board might be elected separately
from a city or town council, for example.57 These are two separate bodies,
each essentially legislative, but without concurrent authority. This Article
is not about the separation of legislative powers across different
government entities, but about the separation of powers within the
legislature of a single local government. Even within a single
government, the legislative power might be divided functionally across
different entities. For example, in a small number of Maine towns, an

52. That committees within each chamber might be required to act, that the Senate has an
effective supermajority requirement in the filibuster, and that the President may veto legislation
affects the shape of the legislative process but not the basic fact of bicameralism. That the Senate alone
acts on treaty ratification and in confirming presidential appointments arguably does make our
legislature unicameral in those areas. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
53. Cf. Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 579–80 n.16 (R.I. 2011) (noting that “the separation of
powers doctrine is a concept foreign to municipal governance” and collecting cases).
54. See Schragger, supra note 17, at 2548 (describing council-manager systems); H. George
Frederickson et al., The Changing Structure of American Cities: A Study of the Diffusion of
Innovation, 64 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 320, 320 (2004) (comparing council-manager cities to
parliamentary systems).
55. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Taylor, Note, Untangling the Law of Site-Specific Rezoning in Florida:
A Critical Evaluation of the Functional Approach, 45 FLA. L. REV. 873, 892 n.155 (1993) (“[Z]oning
boards are vested with the legislative function in creating a comprehensive plan, the judicial function
in granting variances and special exemptions, and the executive function in hiring agents to enforce
zoning and building codes.”).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
57. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37 (2018) (describing school committees as part of towns
and cities); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 1 (2018) (describing process for election of school
committees in towns).
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open town meeting votes on the budget while an elected council passes
all other legislation.58
To tread carefully, I use the following definition of unicameralism.
Unicameralism means the entity that exercises a given legislative power
is organized as one chamber. That chamber can take legislative actions
according to any sort of internal decisionmaking processes. Whether that
is majority vote or supermajority, guided through committees or
otherwise, is immaterial, even if those internal processes create multiple
“vetogates.”59 In bicameralism, two separate and independent chambers
must concurrently agree to take legislative action.
Accordingly, a local government can have two or more separate
unicameral legislatures with nonoverlapping substantive jurisdictions: a
general legislature and a specialized school committee or planning board,
for example. Those legislatures might be parliamentary or, in their field,
paired with an independent executive.
Notably, this means that local unicameralism might involve a
diminution in checks and balances or an abandonment of the
checks-and-balances model altogether. In some cases, the legislature and
the executive still check each other, but the legislature no longer checks
itself.60 In others, the legislature is the only body of local government,
without any internal separation of powers: the mayor might be part of
the legislature and the judiciary separately operated by the state.
Unicameralism is always a move away from the Madisonian system, but
how far a local government departs from that model varies. For this
Article, what matters is the concurrency of decisionmaking within the
designated legislative zone.61 Under this definition, many local
governments began as bicameral, and all have now converged on
unicameral legislative designs. The next Part describes that history.

58. Citizen’s Guide to Town Meeting, ME. MUN. ASS’N, https://www.memun.org/Training
Resources/LocalGovernment/AGuidetoTownMeeting.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
59. Vetogates are the many points in the legislative process where a bill can die, from substantive
committees and rules committees to conference between two chambers to an executive veto. See
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–46
(2008).
60. Legislative unicameralism is often accompanied by increased checks from the executive
branch. This is notably common in the land use context. For example, zoning decisions may be made
in the first instance by an executive-branch planning commission, then ratified by the city council. See,
e.g., N.Y.C. C HARTER § 197-d (2011). While this shares important features with bicameralism, in that
two multimember bodies must both vote on a proposal for it to become law, it implicates
interbranch separation of powers, not intra-legislative bicameralism: It is more akin to the presidential
veto than to Congressional bicameralism. Indeed, the relative importance of checks between the
executive and legislative branches at the local level, as opposed to checks within the legislature, is a
major theme of this Article. See infra Part II.C.
61. Although outside the scope of this Article, it could be illuminating to compare the structure of
local legislatures to the structure of local multimember executive boards and commissions, especially
where those boards are elected. There may be patterns to local organization that cross the branches.
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I. HOW WE GOT HERE
A. A HISTORY OF LOCAL UNICAMERALISM
All local governments¾not many or most, but all¾are unicameral.
The choice to have one legislative chamber rather than two is a defining
feature of the design of local governments. And it is a choice. Unlike most
structural features of our government, no constitutional rule¾federal or
state¾requires local legislatures to have a single chamber. Despite its
utterly uniform nature, there is nothing compulsory or fixed about local
unicameralism. Moreover, local unicameralism is not one constitutional
choice, made at the Founding, or even fifty constitutional choices made
in the states. Local unicameralism is the convergence of thousands of
individual actors independently reaching the same conclusion across a
period of more than a century.
Local governments were not always unicameral. They have moved
steadily in that direction over two centuries. In 1903, one-third of large
cities still had bicameral councils.62 Bicameralism was a common,
high-profile option for local legislatures at the turn of the 20th century.
Nor did American local governments slide into unicameralism unawares.
Local unicameralism is the product of political conflict and intellectual
debate, carried out city-by-city and state-by-state. Yet that debate has
long since ended, making unicameralism appear to be the natural form
of local government. To uncover what pushes local governments into
unicameralism, it helps to turn to the past, when the choice of local
legislative form was a live controversy.
This Part traces the history of local unicameralism from the colonial
era¾when the basic separation of government into branches was not yet
present at the local level¾through 2014, when Everett, Massachusetts
finally gave up its status as the last bicameral city in America. That
history shows consistent motives for local unicameralism, across
centuries and from coast to coast. Its proponents saw unicameral
legislatures as more efficient¾not hampered by the need for consensus
across two fractious bodies¾and evoked images of modernity to support
their desired overhaul of the legislative machine. More mundanely, the
unicameralists also pointed to cost savings: eliminating one legislative
chamber meant fewer salaries to pay.
The defenders of bicameralism, in turn, claimed the ground of
tradition, a tradition ennobled by the federal example. They cited the
value of checks and balances to restrain government overreach. Finally,
they celebrated two-chamber legislatures as offering more positions for
more politicians, increasing public access to their officials and offering
more opportunities for those officials to advance. Of course, mixed in
62. George W. Liebmann, The New American Local Government, 34 URB. LAW. 93, 107 (2002).
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with these principles was politics: one faction or another, varying from
city to city, always perceived a potential advantage in a new legislative
design. But putting the contingencies of any place’s particular political
line-up aside, the debates over local unicameralism¾pitting tradition
against modernity and efficiency against restraint¾provides a rigorous
foundation for beginning the study of local legislative form.
The earliest American local governments did not share even the
most basic trappings of contemporary municipal government. Legally,
cities were understood as corporations.63 As such, their internal
governance diverged dramatically from what we now consider
democratic norms. For example, under Philadelphia’s 1701 Proprietor’s
Charter, which governed the city until 1776, the officers of the
Corporation of Philadelphia chose their own successors.64 These
corporations¾like business corporations today65¾operated with a
single council and generally without a clear separation of powers.66
Councils during the colonial period and the early republic were often
unicameral, but did not particularly resemble legislatures as we know
them today.
Local government began to take its modern shape only after the
Constitutional convention gave the national government a fixed and
culturally resonant form. Baltimore created the first recognizably
bicameral city council in 1797.67 The new Baltimore legislature consisted
of a sixteen-member lower house and an eight-member upper house.68
This structure expressly mimicked the federal model: in an innovation
that did not spread, Baltimore elected its mayor using an electoral
college.69
Older American cities shifted away from colonial modes of
governance and towards bicameralism during the early 19th century.
63. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1095–98 (1980). Frug
contests whether early American local governments were in fact corporations or
“quasi-corporations,” but agrees that the law treated them as corporations. Id.
64. City Council, CITY OF PHILA. DEP’T RECORDS, http://www.phila.gov/phils/Docs/Inventor/
graphics/agencies/A120.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
65. Cf. Levmore, supra note 44, at 162 (comparing unicameralism of local government to
corporate boards).
66. Michele Frisby, Separating the Powers, in HOW AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS WORK:
A HANDBOOK OF CITY, COUNTY, REGIONAL, STATE AND FEDERAL OPERATIONS 105 (Roger L. Kemp ed.,
2002); see also Hendrik Hartog, Because All the World Was Not New York City: Governance,
Property Rights, and the State in the Changing Definition of a Corporation, 1730–1860, 28 BUFF. L.
REV. 91, 98 (1979) (“As in other governmental entities, the practice of government in colonial New
York City was functionally undifferentiated; judicial, administrative, and legislative powers were
blurred and diffuse.”).
67. Frisby, supra note 66, at 106. But see City Council, supra note 64 (describing Philadelphia’s
Council, created in 1789, consisting of both aldermen and Common Council members. Both sets of
councilors jointly selected the Mayor, who sat with them to form a unitary Council).
68. Frisby, supra note 66, at 106.
69. Frisby, supra note 66, at 106.
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Boston abandoned its town meeting form of government in its 1822
charter.70 The new charter replaced the popular assembly as the site of
legislative power, with a forty-eight-member common council and a
twelve-person board of aldermen.71 Bicameralism was widespread
among early American cities.72
By the turn-of-the-century Progressive Era, however, the tide had
turned against bicameralism. The shift to unicameralism in Philadelphia
provides a representative illustration. In Philadelphia, the City Charter
was revised to institute a unicameral City Council in 1919.73 The fight for
charter reform, which included a variety of other “good government”
reforms,74 was led by two factions: business and civic elites, on the one
hand, and on the other, one of two warring factions of the Pennsylvania
Republican party, which meant to use reform to take power in
Philadelphia.75 The reformers, quintessential Progressives, saw
unicameralism as a force for modernity and efficiency¾making it an
effective form of self-governance¾as well as a force against the urban
machines they despised.76
Efficiency formed the heart of the intellectual argument for charter
reform in Philadelphia. Pennsylvania Governor William Sproul, who
went so far as to advocate for Philadelphia charter reform in his inaugural
address, described bicameralism as “unwieldy.”77 Clinton Rogers
Woodruff, a leader of the charter reformers, called the bicameral
legislature “probably the worst governing body that has ever
mis-administered over a great city,” and identified as the remedy a single,
unicameral Council.78 In fighting for unicameralism, elite reformers
fought for a vision of “strong, simple, representative government.”79
Woodruff described Philadelphia’s bicameral (and gerrymandered)
legislature as “an autocracy” given the “cumbersomeness of the city’s
70. Charlie Tebbetts, Charter Changes in Boston from 1885-1949, 32 HIST. J. MASS. 21 (2004).
71. Id.
72. According to a 1922 political scientist, a bicameral council originally governed “the majority
of the cities.” EVERETT KIMBALL, STATE AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 411 (1922).
The reliability of this estimate is uncertain, but the author’s research provides enough evidence to
believe that bicameralism was at least commonplace.
73. City Council, supra note 64.
74. See Stamp out Bolshevism at Home, Demands Governor Sproul Education and Sane Laws
Best Antidote, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 22, 1919, at 12 (describing other charter reform elements of home
rule, fiscal controls, and the attempted depoliticization of the police force).
75. F. W. Coker, Notes on Municipal Affairs, 13 AM. POL. SCI . REV. 643, 643 (1919).
76. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 174–86 (1966)
(describing Progressive Era local politics); Joan Chalmers Williams, The City, the Hope of Democracy:
The Casebook as Moral Act, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1990) (reviewing GERALD FRUG, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW (1988)).
77. Stamp Out Bolshevism at Home, supra note 74.
78. City Laws Passe, Says Woodruff, Charter Revision Urged by Speaker at Business Club
Luncheon Present, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 21, 1919, at 8.
79. Clinton Rogers Woodruff, Progress in Philadelphia, 26 AM. J. SOC. 315, 315 (1920).
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government machinery.”80 He wanted, and believed democracy required,
a legislature that could act swiftly and decisively: “the substitution of an
effective instrument for a clumsy one.”81
These higher-minded ideals were paired with the desire to dislodge
one faction of the Republican Party from its entrenched control of city
government. Because legislative action required the concurrence of two
large chambers, then totaling 146 members, reformers believed that
machine control was necessary to coordinate action.82 That elites
believed the machine to be “the one reaping the greatest benefits from
the present bicameral Councils”¾as did the machine’s political rivals,
who fortuitously controlled the state legislature83¾and considered this
fact an essential argument for political reform.84
Those advocating for unicameralism in Philadelphia necessarily
argued that what was appropriate for the national and state governments
was inapt at the local level. Said Leslie Miller, a leader of the Committee
of Seventy, an elite Philadelphia civic organization:
The existing system of copying and repeating in the management of
municipal affairs the government machinery of the Nation and the
State¾legislative, executive, judicial, and all that¾is certainly a mistake.
It has had a fair trial and has continued far too long already, and whatever
is to replace it, it should be abolished as completely as possible.85

Writing in the American Journal of Sociology, Woodruff argued,
“To expect satisfactory results from such a body modeled on the federal
plan of government was to expect the impossible.”86 These leaders did
not extend their critique of bicameralism to higher levels of government.
Indeed, they saw it as self-evident that local government was different

80. One Council Plan Gains in Favor, Charter Revision Along That Idea is Indorsed Generally,
supra note 2, at 6.
81. Woodruff, supra note 79, at 316.
82. David R. Contosta, George Woodward, Philadelphia Progressive, 111 PA. MAG. HIST.
& BIOGRAPHY 341, 357 (1987).
83. THE COMM. OF SEVENTY, The Charter: A History 2 (1980), https://www.seventy.org/
uploads/files/127709242549666483-1980-charter-history.pdf. In Philadelphia and elsewhere,
pushes for bicameralism were usually paired with efforts to reduce the total number of
councilmembers. Efficiency thus took two distinct, though related paths: Reformers wanted to
streamline operations within each chamber as well as across them. There is an extensive political
science literature describing the public choice consequences of changing the number of legislatures
per chamber and positing that a “law of 1/n” applies wherein more logrolling in larger bodies leads to
increased government spending. See generally, e.g., Barry R. Weingast et al., The Political Economy
of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642, 642,
654 (1981). But see David M. Primo & James M. Snyder, Jr., Distributive Politics and the Law of 1/n*,
70 J. POL. 477, 477 (2008) (describing many variables affecting “law”).
84. Big Men to Attend Charter Hearing, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 23, 1919, at 14.
85. Charter Revision Bills Soon Ready, Committee Plans to Present Bills to Legislature Next
Month Indorsements, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 10, 1919, at 22.
86. Woodruff, supra note 79, at 315.
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than state or national government, providing little principled argument
for the difference.
The Philadelphians’ distinction proved accurate descriptively: while
state government remains largely bicameral, “the movement for
simplified local government continue[d] on its triumphant way”
throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries.87 As with many
Progressive Era urban reforms, change came first to the West. After San
Francisco ended the alcalde and ayuntamiento system of governance it
inherited from Spain and Mexico, it experimented with a bicameral city
council from 1850 to 1856 as its first Anglo-American-inspired system of
government, moving to unicameralism just six years later.88 In charter
revision fights that lasted the next half-century,89 it considered returning
to bicameralism at various points, but never did so.90 Seattle’s brief fling
with bicameralism lasted just as long. Seattle had a bicameral council
under its original 1890 charter, but abandoned it only six years later.91
The city considered two houses inefficient and paying two sets of
legislators expensive.92 Indeed, the Seattle city council issued a joint
resolution in its first year calling for a reduction in the number of city
councilors.93
In the East, too, advocates of unicameralism also saw reform as a
modernizing and streamlining endeavor. Boston rewrote its charter in
1909, moving to a unicameral, at-large system.94 As in Philadelphia and
Seattle, good government groups wanted to replace an “unwieldy”
system.95 The new system was modeled after the National Municipal
League’s model charter, evidencing the importance of national
intellectual trends and new Progressive institutions.96 Indeed,
unicameralism could be deemed the Progressive Era’s most complete
success in restructuring local government. While Progressive reforms
like non-partisan elections and appointed city managers were important,

87. Woodruff, supra note 79, at 317.
88. WILLIAM A. BULLOUGH, THE BLIND BOSS & HIS CITY: CHRISTOPHER AUGUSTINE BUCKLEY AND
NINETEENTH-CENTURY SAN FRANCISCO 54–55 (1979).
89. Id. at 257.
90. See CHARTER, PREPARED AND PROPOSED FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN F RANCISCO art. II, § 1
(1887) (“The Legislative power of the City and County of San Francisco shall be vested in two Houses
of Legislation, which shall be designated the Supervisors of said city and county, and shall consist of a
Board of Aldermen and a Board of Delegates.”).
91. Seattle City Council Members, 1890-1896, SEATTLE MUN. ARCHIVES, http://www.
seattle.gov/cityarchives/seattle-facts/city-officials/city-council-members/city-council-1890-1896
(last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
92. Seattle’s New Charter, OREGONIAN, Jan. 29, 1896, at 5.
93. Reconstruct the Charter, TACOMA DAILY NEWS, Dec. 3, 1890, at 4.
94. Tebbetts, supra note 70, at 14–15.
95. LAWRENCE W. KENNEDY, PLANNING THE CITY UPON A HILL: BOSTON SINCE 1630 122 (1992).
96. JAMES J. CONNOLLY, THE TRIUMPH OF ETHNIC PROGRESSIVISM: URBAN POLITICAL CULTURE IN
BOSTON, 1900-1925 90 (2009).
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new, and popular innovations in local government, neither was
implemented so uniformly across the nation.97
While factional politics were always important to the passage of
unicameralism¾as is usually the case in urban politics¾there was no
fixed arrangement of who lined up on which side of the issue. In Boston,
for example, unicameralism (and associated reformers) was meant to
“subvert the influence and power of the ward bosses, who had been the
focal point of Irish and poor immigrant political opportunity.”98 But in
Richmond, Virginia, disempowered groups were essential allies in the
fight for unicameralism.
Due to restrictions in the Virginia Constitution,99 Richmond
remained one of the last cities with a bicameral council, changing to
unicameralism only in a 1947 vote.100 Business elites once again led the
fight for a single-chambered legislature, as elsewhere believing
bicameralism to be “antiquated and clumsy” and not fit for a “modern”
city.101 Interestingly, future Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, then a
leader in the Richmond business community, chaired the charter
commission that ultimately ended bicameralism in the city.102
Richmond’s black community allied with Powell and the business
community.103 Black leaders, including unicameralism supporters such
as the president of the local NAACP, saw charter reform as a way to “kill
red tape and political expediency by which Negroes are denied jobs and
social justice.”104 Indeed, their bet paid immediate dividends. After
charter reform, civil rights attorney Oliver Hill was elected to the City
Council, the first African American to hold that position since

97. See Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Representation in Municipal Government,
108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 612–13 (2014) (identifying these reforms as characteristic of Progressive
Era attempts to make government more responsive); Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections, NAT’L
LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/partisan-vs-nonpartisan-elections (categorizing thirty largest
cities between partisan and nonpartisan electoral systems).
98. Tebbetts, supra note 70, at 15; see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unsubsidizing Suburbia,
90 MINN. L. REV. 459, 474 (2005) (reviewing RICHARDSON DILWORTH, THE URBAN ORIGINS OF
SUBURBAN AUTONOMY (2005)) (describing religious and ethnic politics of the era).
99. See VA. CONST. OF 1902, art. VIII, § 121, http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/
Virginia_1902.pdf; see also William Bennett Munro, Notes on Current Municipal Affairs, 3 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 245, 249 (1909) (noting that Richmond Mayor D.C. Richardson declared himself in favor of
unicameral government, but constrained by Virginia constitution).
100. Many Cities O.K. Change in Government: Richmond Will Have Manager, CHI. DAILY TRIB.,
Dec 1, 1947, at 15 (identifying only fourteen American cities as still having bicameral councils after
Richmond’s vote).
101. Associated Press, City Manager Is Advocated in Richmond, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1941, at
19 (statement of the Richmond First Club).
102. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 124 (1994).
103. WILLIE AVON DRAKE & ROBERT D. HOLSWORTH, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE STALLED QUEST
FOR BLACK PROGRESS 39 (1996).
104. Unicameral Council Advantages Explained: White Lawyer Advises Race To Study City
Structure, RICHMOND NEW JOURNAL AND GUIDE, Mar. 6, 1937, at A2.
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Reconstruction.105 While civic and business leaders supported
unicameralism as a general rule, whom they allied with¾and whom
unicameralism empowered¾varied depending on the particular political
context and the other charter reforms with which it was paired.
Despite the relentless trend towards unicameralism¾which was
nearly unheard of for cities to move from a single-chambered to a doublechambered legislature after the Civil War¾there was opposition in each
city as debates actually took place. The debate in Atlanta, another late
adopter of bicameralism, is instructive. In Atlanta, unicameralism was
first enacted106 as part of a wide-ranging “Plan of Improvement” passed
in the early 1950s which included the annexation of eighty-two square
miles of territory, the consolidation of certain city and county functions,
and other governmental reforms.107 The immediate impetus for change
was a diagnosis of “suburbanitis . . . the inability of cities to cope with the
paralyzing problem of urban developments on fringes just outside
municipal limits,” and the cure was “more efficient local government”
and “streamlin[ing].”108 A century after West Coast cities moved to
unicameral legislatures, Atlanta was offering the same arguments in its
favor, simply updated to the postwar context.
The Atlantan arguments for retaining bicameralism, too, were the
traditional ones found in other cities. Following the traditional
arguments for bicameralism at the national level, some saw local
bicameralism as providing important “checks on city finances.”109 In
Atlanta, these opponents were mollified with new procedural limits on
the unicameral legislature’s power: Specifically, allowing a single
member to effectively filibuster by delaying a matter involving city

105. DRAKE & HOLSWORTH, supra note 103, at 39. For a biography of Hill, an important civil rights
leader, see Oliver W. Hill Building Dedication, VA. DEP’T GEN. SERVS. (Oct. 28, 2005),
https://www.dhr.virginia.gov/registers/Cities/Richmond/127-6048_FinanceBuilding_2008_NR_
final.pdf.
106. Atlanta’s City Council had been bicameral since the city’s incorporation in 1847.
A Chronology of the History of Atlanta, 1782-2010, ATLANTA CITY COUNCIL, http://citycouncil.atl
antaga.gov/historynew.htm (last updated Apr. 17, 2003).
107. See Hoke Smith May, Plan Adds 100,000 Population, 82 Sq. Miles to Atlanta Proper,
ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 12, 1951, at 24; see also Cleghorn Reese, What’s Happened in Year Under
Atlanta-Fulton ‘Plan of Improvement,’ ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 28, 1952, at 1D; Herman Hancock,
Stronger Hand for Hartsfield Seen in City Council Shakeup, ATLANTA CONST., Dec 13, 1953, at 2C.
Thus, while this Article primarily identifies unicameralism with antigrowth or NIMBY sentiments in
the suburbs, see infra Part II.B, here, unicameralism is associated with the so-called “growth machine”
of urban development (or the related “regime theory” originally developed to describe Atlanta itself).
See David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the Field from the Field, 21 J.L.
& POL. 261, 266 n.13 (2005) (describing theories).
108. Herman Hancock, Other Cities Study Plan Improvement: Atlanta Sets Pattern, ATLANTA
CONST., July 26, 1953, at 4C.
109. Reduction in Council And Number of Wards To Face Senate Today: Millican Bill Is Assailed
By Aldermen, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 5, 1952, at 1.
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finances for one meeting.110 Other opponents relied on tradition itself,
arguing that divided government was the most familiar, or even the most
American, form of legislative structure.111 At the most mundane level,
legislators argued that the bicameral structure simply provided more
seats for legislators, improving constituent services.112
These defenses of bicameralism¾checks and balances, tradition,
and size¾mirror those made across the country. Bicameralism advocates
everywhere, like the framers of the federal Constitution, saw the system
as a necessary check against imprudent legislation.113 For opponents of
unicameralism in conservative Richmond that meant a fear of higher
taxes,114 but the content could vary.115 In Philadelphia, it was argued that
the size of a bicameral legislature provided a larger pool of trained
politicians fit for higher office.116
Even today, the battle lines remain fixed in place: in Everett,
Massachusetts, the same arguments arose on each side. Advocates of
unicameralism saw the old council as “a place of bickering, gridlock, and
confusion. When you have 18 in one branch and seven in the other,
there’s no consensus.”117 Financial savings played a significant role, with
Everett Mayor Carlo DeMaria citing the councilors’ salaries and health
premiums as major expenses worth eliminating.118 The same
modernizing rhetoric was deployed: “[i]t’s time to bring Everett into the
21st century,” said the Chairman of the Charter Revision Commission.119
“It’s time to have a more efficient, more accountable, more
straightforward form of government.”120
110. Gilliam White & Raleigh Bryans, Irked Councilmen To Seek ‘Rights’ in Home Rule, ATLANTA
CONST., Feb. 17, 1952, at 10B.
111. Id. (“Some council members resent the change—even though the present bicameral system
has been virtually inoperative for years¾for the sake of sentiment and continuity.”); Hoke Smith May,
Solon Views Atlanta Plan as Red ‘Plot,’ ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 6, 1951, at 1 (quoting the Chairman of
the Georgia House Municipal Government Committee, who described the Plan of Improvement as “a
typical Communist plot to consolidate government.”).
112. Reduction in Council And Number of Wards To Face Senate Today: Millican Bill Is Assailed
By Aldermen, supra note 109, at 1 (“Councilman Jesse Draper objected to any reduction in council’s
membership, and said the duties of the office are now arduous because of the demand made by
constituents.”).
113. KIMBALL, supra note 72, at 411.
114. JEFFRIES, JR., supra note 102, at 124.
115. The Seattle Charter Will Soon Be Submitted to the People. City Officers All Elective,
OREGONIAN, July 18, 1890, at 2 (describing Seattle’s 1890 charter, which included a bicameral
legislature, as “very stringent and the object has been to place the strongest possible safeguard around
the public treasury”).
116. Woodruff, supra note 79, at 316.
117. Rosenberg, supra note 7.
118. Rosenberg, supra note 7.
119. John Laidler, New Effort to Downsize Government, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 6, 2011),
http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2011/03/06/in_everett_a_new_effort_to_streamli
ne_government/.
120. Id.
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Defenders of the old, bicameral legislature, like those that came
before them, emphasized the importance of checks and balances, the
value of tradition¾especially the conventional understanding of
bicameralism as a crowning achievement of American constitutionalism
and the benefits of a larger legislature. “Why would you fix something
that is not broken?” asked one member of the Everett Common
Council.121 “I thought it was the best form of government. You had checks
and balances.”122 The President of the Board of Aldermen highlighted the
additional access that citizens had to their officials with two overlapping
legislative bodies.123 Another Everett Alderman, like Philadelphians
before him, asked where Everett would find its mayors without a
bicameral city council serving as a farm system.124 Everett weighed the
same arguments as American cities have for centuries and then, finally,
abandoned ship on bicameralism.
What unicameralism and bicameralism have been understood to
offer local governments has remained remarkably constant for 150 years
and in every case, unicameralism has won out. Legislators and voters,
then and now, see local government as in need of modernization, not
bound to tradition, and chafe at local government’s inefficiencies without
fearing an unchecked single chamber. They see bicameralism as so
useless at the local level that it is not worth even paying the salaries of a
second set of councilmen. Local government was consciously designed
and adapted to embody a particular set of values and not the values of the
federal Constitution.
B. UNICAMERALISM IN SUBURBIA
So far, this history has focused on large cities. Urban centers
embraced bicameralism early on, and their transition from one
legislative structure to another shows the contingency and conflicts that
marked the adoption of unicameralism. These transitions are where the
values behind local unicameralism are made most visible. In contrast,
unicameralism has always been firmly entrenched in the suburbs.
In suburbs, as compared to cities, government structure is more
often set forth by generally applicable statutes. Larger cities tend to be
governed by customizable charters, where drafters write on a blank slate
and generally could have the choice to adopt bicameralism.125 In contrast,
121. Rosenberg, supra note 7.
122. Rosenberg, supra note 7.
123. Rosenberg, supra note 7.
124. Independent Staff, Everett Charter Commission Holds Public Hearing on Restructuring of
City Government, EVERETT INDEP. (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.everettindependent.com/2011/
04/06/everett-charter-commission-holds-public-hearing-on-restructuring-of-city-government/.
125. Cf. Christopher J. Tyson, Municipal Identity as Property, 118 PENN ST. L. R EV. 647, 661 (2014)
(connecting liberalized municipal incorporation laws with “an explosion in the number, size, and
character of suburban municipalities” outside historic urban centers).
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smaller local governments instead use “off-the-rack” governmental
forms set by the states.126 State incorporation statutes generally do not
provide for bicameralism.
For example, in Massachusetts¾where heated debate over the
structure of Boston’s city council implicated issues of ethnicity, religion,
corruption, and good government,127 and where Everett remained
resolutely bicameral until just a few years ago¾the general incorporation
statute offers no option for bicameralism. It provides six different plans
for cities to choose between, each of which is unicameral.128 The
Massachusetts menu of options is not limited to unicameralism out of a
fear of difference. One option provides for proportional
representation,129 a fairly exotic electoral structure in this country.130 But
to the Massachusetts legislature, even proportional representation is
more appropriate for local governments than bicameralism¾no matter
the latter’s constitutional pedigree.
Massachusetts is not alone in denying bicameralism as an option in
its general municipal incorporation statutes. California, for example,
offers choices between strong and weak mayoral systems, between
district-based and at-large council elections, and between numbers of
council districts, but all within a unicameral framework.131 Texas requires
its general law municipalities to be unicameral, although they may
choose between a city council, a Board of Aldermen, a Board of
Commissioners, and a city manager-type system, each with its own
structure.132 Moreover, under the Texas Constitution, small
municipalities are required to be incorporated under general law, not by
custom charter, meaning there is no chance to develop their own

126. Id.
127. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
128. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 1 (2018) (defining Plans A–F); § 2 (requiring choice of Plan); §§ 50,
59, 67, 82, 96 (providing additional detail on Plans). To be precise, these Plans are available to
municipalities defined as “cities” and not “towns” under state law, which tends to mean mid-size
municipalities. See MASS. CONST. art. LXXXI, § 2 (limiting city forms of government to municipalities
of 12,000 or more residents). Towns have a separate set of unicameral local governments they may
choose, growing out of the town meeting tradition. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43A (2018).
129. MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 96 (2018). This option exists for the benefit of Cambridge, which
uses a proportional system. McSweeney v. City of Cambridge, 665 N.E.2d 11 (Mass. 1996).
130. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of
Proportional Representation: Why Won’t It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257 (1985); Lani Guinier,
Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1589, 1594–95 (1993) (suggesting proportional representation replace “current doctrinal
approaches”).
131. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 34871 (West 2017); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 36801, 36802, 36810
(each describing the meetings of “the city council” in a manner which necessarily implies a unicameral
city council).
132. See TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, 2015 HANDBOOK FOR MAYORS AND COUNCILMEMBERS ch. 1 (2015),
http://www.tml.org/Handbook-M&C/Chapter1.pdf (summarizing Texas incorporation law).
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(potentially bicameral) model.133 New York’s Town Law,134 Second Class
Cities Law,135 and Village Law136 each provide for unicameral structures
for the forms of local government they regulate. While large, chartered
cities have chosen unicameralism,137 small general-law municipalities
have unicameralism chosen for them.
Bicameralism does not appear to have had any significant presence
in suburban governance. While two-chambered legislatures were once
common in city governments, small towns and bedroom communities
have always been exclusively unicameral. Whatever forces drive local
governments towards unicameralism, they are stronger in the suburbs.
C. AN ANOMALY: NEW YORK CITY
One anomalous case bears separate mention: New York City. New
York is often an outlier in local government law,138 and its path to
unicameralism is distinct from that of other cities. First, New York is the
rare (perhaps unique¾I can find no other) city that has moved from
bicameralism to unicameralism and back again. Prior to consolidation,
New York (then limited to Manhattan) created a bicameral legislature in
1830 and moved to unicameralism in the “Reform Charter” of 1873.139
After the consolidation of the five boroughs, New York briefly used a
bicameral system, likely to reflect the independent political identities of
the boroughs.140 A unicameral city council was reinstated nearly
immediately in 1901 due to concerns about bicameralism “snarling” city
government.141 New York flipped back to bicameralism between 1924 and
1936 and has stayed unicameral since.142 But even since then, New York
133. TEXAS CONST., art. 11, § 4.
134. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 20(1) (West 2014).
135. N.Y. SECOND CLASS CITIES LAW § 31 (West 2017).
136. N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF LOCAL GOV. SERVS., LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK 70 (6th ed.
2011), https://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/Local_Government_Handbook.pdf (citing N.Y.
VILLAGE LAW art. 2).
137. Not in all instances, of course: state legislation has been the path to unicameralism for many
large cities. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 75.
138. See, e.g., Jon C. Teaford, The Birth of a Public Corporation, 1730-1870, 83 MICH. L. R EV. 690,
701 (1985) (reviewing HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW (1983)) (“New York City was an unusual case both before and
after the Revolution.”); Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
953, 968 (1967) (“To regard the government of New York as a local government is to make nonsense
of the term.”).
139. Edward T. O’Donnell & Alex Poole, Changes to the City Charter, 1653–2008, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK 230–31 (Kenneth T. Jackson, ed., 2d ed. 2010).
140. See id. at 232; see also James W. Lowe, Examination of Governmental Decentralization in
New York City and A New Model for Implementation, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173 (1990) (describing
history of New York legislature).
141. O’Donnell & Poole, supra note 139, at 232; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. & Eric Lane, The
Policy and Politics of Charter Making: The Story of New York City’s 1989 Charter, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 775, 783–86 (1998).
142. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 784.
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has more than once seriously considered returning to a bicameral City
Council, unlike other American cities.143
Second, through most of the 20th century, New York’s unicameral
legislature played second fiddle to a quasi-legislative entity, the Board of
Estimate, with which it shared certain powers. The City Council (or Board
of Aldermen, depending on the styling of the time) formally held the
legislative power of New York City.144 But the Council exercised little
power in practice. In their authoritative description of mid-century New
York politics, Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman described the City
Council’s record as “an abundance of trifles”145 and archly noted that
“[t]he Council has disappointed even its least hopeful members.”146 One
City Council member joked that the Council “was not even a rubber
stamp because ‘a rubber stamp leaves an impression.”147
Instead, the Board of Estimate exercised much of what might be
considered legislative power. The Board of Estimate shared lawmaking
power with the Council on taxation levels and charter revision, had a
dominant role in the budget process compared to the Council, and had
sole authority over city planning and zoning, control of city property and
city personnel, and the granting of franchises.148
But while sometimes compared to the upper chamber of a
legislature,149 the Board of Estimate was not a legislature. The Board was
not independently elected, but rather was a “caucus of officials, acting ex
officio as members of the Board of Estimate.”150 It generally lacked broad
policymaking power; with the exception of the budget, its authority
generally focused on narrower case-by-case determinations.151 Its

143. See infra notes 154-158 (discussing debates during 1989 charter revisions); see also Hal
Hazelrigg, Charter Hopes Mount in City, Despite Curbs, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., May 6, 1934, at A1
(describing proposal by former governor Al Smith to create new bicameral New York City legislature
“similar to the State Legislature”).
144. WALLACE S. SAYRE & HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY: POLITICS IN THE
METROPOLIS 607 (1960). The city charter provided that “[t]he council shall be vested with the
legislative power of the city, and shall be the local legislative body of the city, with the sole power to
adopt local laws.” Id.
145. Id. at 611.
146. Id. at 652.
147. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 781.
148. SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 144, at 627–28.
149. See, e.g., Michael A. Cardozo, Reflections on the 1989 Charter Revisions, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 85, 90 (2013-2014) (“The 1989 Commission replaced bicameral approval of the budget by the
Board of Estimate and Council, with unicameral approval by the Council alone.”).
150. SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 144, at 650 (“[W]hile the Board exercises many of the powers
of a legislature, it does not function like one.”); see also Todd S. Purdum, A 2-House Legislature for
New York City?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/20/nyregion/
a-2-house-legislature-for-new-york-city.html (noting that the Board of Estimate, although quasilegislative, “does not have the size or structure or committees of a legislature”).
151. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 771–72 (The Board of Estimate “lacked the broad
legislative authority needed to promote and effectuate policies different from a mayor’s. . . . The
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functions were as much executive as legislative. The President, after all,
has roles in the legislative process similar to those of the Board of
Estimate: the constitutional power to veto and, by statute, the first step
in the budget process.152 Imprecise analogies notwithstanding, New York
fell into its own category of legislative structure: not truly bicameral, for
the Board of Estimate was its own entity entirely, but with some of the
features of bicameralism and evidencing a greater comfort with multiple
entities coexisting in the legislative sphere.
As a result of these differences, the final move to full unicameralism
looked somewhat different in New York City than elsewhere. In 1989, in
the wake of a Supreme Court decision holding the Board of Estimate
unconstitutional, New York embarked on a major charter reform.153 The
charter reform commission seriously considered whether a bicameral
Council should replace the Council-plus-Board structure.154 New York
worked through familiar arguments for and against unicameralism. The
charter commission saw bicameralism as promoting a “more disciplined
and deliberative regimen” and avoiding “precipitous legislative
action.”155 Bicameralism was also touted as a way to double the
opportunities for citizen participation, to elevate the city’s status to
something more akin to a state government, and simply to preserve the
status quo.156 Unicameralists argued that a single chambered-legislature
would be more powerful and effective, touted the city as distinct from the
state¾“[s]lavish adherence to the state model may not be appropriate,”
noted then-Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer¾and once again
flagged the issue, hardly of constitutional import, of a second set of
salaries.157 Ultimately, however, bicameralism was rejected because the
bicameral proposals under consideration would have diminished the
political power of racial minorities.158 Still, although New York has ended
up with the same legislative structure as all other local governments¾a

members strike bargains on homeless shelters, for example, but never consider how to solve
homelessness.”).
152. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-44, § 201–1-17,
88 Stat. 297 (1974).
153. Bd. of Estimate of City of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
154. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 778–79; see also Purdum, supra note 150 (describing
bicameralism debates as “perhaps the most contentious question” addressed by Charter Revision
Committee).
155. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 786.
156. Purdum, supra note 150. Another argument for bicameralism¾which unsurprisingly failed
to carry the day¾was that it allows for “pass[ing] the buck” between the two chambers. Purdum, supra
note 150.
157. Purdum, supra note 150.
158. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 786, 813; see also Todd S. Purdum, Black and
Hispanic Officials Are Cool to 2-House Plan, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/
1989/05/01/nyregion/black-and-hispanic-officials-are-cool-to-2-house-plan.html.
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stand-alone City Council¾it consistently showed a greater inclination
towards bicameralism.
There are many reasons why New York might have leaned more
toward bicameralism. New York was formed out of the merger of two
large, independent cities and various smaller towns: Like the states
represented in the Senate, a demand for independent representation of
these original political subdivisions, as subdivisions, remains.159 New
York is also simply larger than any other American city. The city has a
larger population than 40 out of 50 states,160 and its budget is larger than
those of every state but California, Texas, Florida, and New York State.161
In terms of size and capacity, New York is more akin to a state than most
other local governments, and may, like states, have more need for
bicameralism. New York’s size also makes New York particularly diverse,
generating demand for more forms of representation. Whatever the
reasons, New York is an unusual example of unicameralism. It bolsters
the fact of uniform local unicameralism: even New York City has fully
adopted it. But in many ways, it is the exception that proves the rule, the
outlier that keeps flirting with bicameralism.
D. A HISTORY OF STATE BICAMERALISM
At the national level, bicameralism is firmly entrenched¾given
special protections by the federal constitution and afforded special
normative value by the Framers and contemporary scholars¾and not the
subject of any meaningful amendment efforts. In contrast, local
governments have uniformly moved towards unicameralism, embracing
efficiency as the highest value for a legislative structure and minimizing
the importance of both tradition and checks and balances. Examining the
intermediate level of state government helps make sense of this divide.
The states are overwhelmingly bicameral: Only Nebraska has adopted a
unicameral legislature.162 Yet unlike the national government, Article V
159. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 786 (“For some members of the Commission . . . the
small upper house was initially seen as an opportunity to give a legislative role to borough
presidents.”); see also Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance:
The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 775, 816 (1992) (“Morris makes it much more difficult for a state to require, or for a
city to provide, special representation for a distinctive territorial subunit within the city.”).
160. New York City Population, N.Y.C. DEP’T CITY PLANNING, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/plan
ning/data-maps/nyc-population/population-facts.page (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
161. FISCAL POL’Y INST., NEW YORK CITY TAXES¾TRENDS, IMPACT AND PRIORITIES FOR REFORM
1 (2015), http://fiscalpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/NYC-Tax-Report-Summary.pdf.
162. Additionally, Washington, D.C. has a unicameral government that in certain ways is better
analogized to a state than a city. See Johnny Barnes, Towards Equal Footing: Responding to the
Perceived Constitutional, Legal and Practical Impediments to Statehood for the District of Columbia,
13 U.D.C. L. REV. 1, 20 (2010) (cataloguing examples of Congress or the courts treating D.C. as a state).
But D.C. is run by a “mayor” and its home rule act describes itself as a “charter for local government.”
Pub. L. 93–198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973). Regardless, Washington is an anomalous case. Unlike either cities
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and other legacies of the constitutional convention cannot explain their
bicameralism. State constitutions are changed more frequently and more
thoroughly than the federal constitution.
This Part shows how the divergent choices of legislative structure by
state and local governments cast into sharper contrast the purposes and
nature of local government itself. While states are seen as dual sovereigns
with the national government163¾fundamentally similar and therefore
requiring basically similar legislatures¾local governments are not
understood as simply another, still smaller, level of government. While
state government, like the national government, is seen as requiring
constraint, local government is empowered. While state government, like
the national government, has its structure infused with cultural meaning,
not to be discarded lightly, local government is seen as a tool to be freely
adapted to the needs of the moment. Citizens and politicians want states
to look like the federal government, but they impose no such requirement
on local governments.
In the Revolutionary period, the form of state legislative power was
contested, and the eventual dominance of bicameralism was not a
foregone conclusion. The two most influential early state constitutions
were those of Massachusetts, enacted in 1780, and of Pennsylvania, from
1776.164 The former represented a more conservative approach to
constitutionalism, marked by checks and balances between the branches;
the latter a more radical alternative marked by “ultrademocratic”
legislative supremacy.165 The Massachusetts model is familiar¾it
inspired the federal constitution.166 Pennsylvania, in contrast, adopted a
structure much more similar to today’s local governments than to today’s
federal government. Pennsylvania adopted a unicameral legislature with
a weak executive and weak judiciary.167
Although unfamiliar to us today as a model for state government,
Pennsylvania’s embrace of unicameralism¾and its identification of
unicameralism with democracy and the recent revolution¾had a
distinguished intellectual legacy. Thomas Paine’s Common Sense called

or states, it is subject to direct Congressional control and falls outside the bounds of normal local
government law. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
163. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution
establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government.”).
164. Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania’s Radical
1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 541, 546
(1989).
165. Id. at 554.
166. Id. at 541–42 (quoting John Adams’ declaration “I made a Constitution for Massachusetts,
which finally made the Constitution of the United States.”).
167. Id. at 556. Other limits on governmental power included one-year terms and restrictive term
limits, as well as requirements that bills be passed in successive legislative terms. Id. at 557.
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for establishing unicameral legislatures.168 Benjamin Franklin, too,
supported unicameralism in the states, and his influence was strongly felt
in his home state.169 Nor did Pennsylvania stand alone in its
constitutional structure. Vermont and Georgia each employed
unicameral legislatures during the early republic,170 and other states
seriously considered the idea.171
The theories behind early unicameralism are particularly relevant
for understanding the more widespread adoption of unicameralism at
the local level. Some of Pennsylvania’s democrats, like their opponents,
understood the risks of concentrating power in a single branch made of
a single chamber.172 Their solution, however, relied on “bicameralism
from below.”173 They expected additional popular participation to check
the legislature, rather than a second elite branch to do the same.174
Alternatively, some believed, following the Whig ideology of the time,
that societies were fundamentally homogeneous, and that “the people”
shared a basic set of interests which their legislature could represent.175
Under this theory, limits on government power or efficacy could only
hamper the state’s ability to do the people’s work (or introduce
aristocratic distortions). As historian Gordon Wood phrased it, “a
tyranny by the people was theoretically inconceivable.”176 Thus, either of
two arguably interconnected conditions could be seen as justifying
unicameralism: strong institutions of public participation allowing for
direct control and discipline of the legislature or a homogeneous citizenry
168. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 96 (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Classics 1986) (1776) (“LET
the assemblies be annual, with a President only. The representation more equal. Their business wholly
domestic, and subject to the authority of a Continental Congress.”); see also Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The
Revolutionary Portfolio: Constitution-Making and the Wider World in the American Revolution, 47
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 759, 783 (2014) (“Thomas Paine, in Common Sense, suggested that in governments
based on popular sovereignty, all power should reside in a unicameral legislature.”).
169. Williams, supra note 164, at 577 (James Madison, recalling the constitutional convention,
noted that only the Pennsylvania delegation dissented from the decision to adopt a bicameral
Congress, “probably from complaisance to Docr. Franklin who was understood to be partial to a single
House of Legislation.”). Williams, supra note 164, at 577 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 25, at 48 (statement of James Madison, May 31, 1787)).
170. John Dinan, Framing A “People’s Government”: State Constitution-Making in the
Progressive Era, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 933, 957–58 (1999).
171. Williams, supra note 164, at 564 (describing North Carolina’s constitutional convention
adopting bicameralism only after debate and compromise with more democratic factions); Williams,
supra note 164, at 585 n.229 (the famous Shays Rebellion in Massachusetts advocated for an end to
the Massachusetts Senate and the imposition of unicameralism).
172. Williams, supra note 164, at 558.
173. Williams, supra note 164, at 565 (quoting STAUGHTON LYND, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN RADICALISM 171 (1968)).
174. Williams, supra note 164, at 558 (“[C]heck it from below¾with more democracy¾rather than
from above, with less.”) (quoting Jesse Lemisch, The American Revolution Seen from the Bottom Up,
in TOWARDS A NEW PAST: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 14–15 (Barton Bernstein ed.,
1968)).
175. Williams, supra note 164, at 581.
176. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 62 (1969).
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with shared interests. Both these conditions exist at the local level to a far
greater degree than at higher levels of government, as will be discussed
later.
Of course, these early experiments with unicameralism at the state
level did not last. Prominent constitutional thinkers of the time argued
vociferously against unicameralism. In his influential 1776 essay
“Thoughts on Government,” John Adams painted single-chambered
legislatures¾whether possessed of full parliamentary power or sharing
authority with an executive and judicial branch¾as “apt to be
avaricious,” “apt to grow ambitious,” “liable to all the vices, follies, and
frailties of an individual,” and “subject to fits of humor, starts of passion,
flights of enthusiasm, partialities, or prejudice¾and consequently
productive of hasty results and absurd judgments.”177 Adams won the
day, not only at the national level, but also eventually among all the early
states. Georgia switched to bicameralism in 1789, Pennsylvania in 1790,
and Vermont in 1836.178 Even so, the ideological debate of the founding
era illuminates the ultimate divergence of state and local legislative
structure.
The states began to reconsider their choice of legislative structure in
the Progressive Era. During the early 20th century, many Progressives
came to believe that existing forms of government were creaky,
inefficient, and often corrupt.179 Government reform took many
shapes¾at the state level, the introduction of the initiative and
referendum may have been the most obvious constitutional
amendments180¾and a reconsideration of bicameralism was one.
Progressives hoped to make local governments more businesslike, and
corporations are generally unicameral.181 Bicameralism was also seen as
one of many structural features permitting conservative interests to block
legislation like minimum wage statutes or workers’ compensation, and
therefore an impediment to a truer form of democracy.182 As California
Governor Hiram Johnson put it, describing his own set of institutional
177. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS
87 (George A. Peek, Jr. ed., Hackett Publ. 2003) (1776).
178. G. ALAN TARR, BICAMERALISM OR UNICAMERALISM?, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE MAJORITY POLICY
COMMITTEE, PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE 2 (2010), https://statecon.camden.rutgers.edu/sites/
statecon/files/publications/bicameralism.pdf.
179. See supra note 76 and accompanying text discussing progressive ideology.
180. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1512 (1990)
(“Direct democracy, the conventional history tells us, was a response of the Progressive Reform
movement to the widely perceived corruption and control of legislatures by corporate wealth.”).
181. See Schleicher, supra note 19, at 465 (on Progressive analogy of governments to business);
Levmore, supra note 44, at 162 (noting that corporate boards are generally unicameral).
182. Dinan, supra note 170, at 958–59 (“Whereas bicameralism had originally been viewed as a
guarantee of legislative deliberation, on the ground that it permitted a refinement of the public views,
a number of convention delegates began to conclude that this arrangement did more to thwart than to
secure the public interest.”).
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reforms (not including unicameralism), “[t]he historic system of checks
and balances guarded against the old danger of governmental aggression,
but not sufficiently against the new danger of [private] aggression . . . we
found it necessary that the system of checks and balances that some view
with such idolatry and with such pride, should be eliminated in our
constitution.”183
In Massachusetts, the state that paved the way for bicameralism at
the founding, the constitutional convention of 1917-1919 debated both an
outright move to unicameralism and a proposal to give the lower house
the power to override the state Senate.184 Constitutional conventions in
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Ohio also debated unicameralism seriously.185
Governors proposed unicameralism in Arizona, California, Kansas,
Minnesota, Washington, and South Dakota.186 Unicameralism received
fifty-eight percent of the vote in an Oklahoma referendum but was not
enacted due to the large number of abstentions denying unicameralism
an outright majority of votes cast.187
In Arizona, the state Senate passed a bill eliminating its own
chamber in 1912, although the bill died in the House.188 The bill’s chief
sponsor, Senator Worsley, argued for a form of “bicameralism from
below,” familiar from debates a century earlier. He pointed to the new
powers of initiative, referendum and recall as providing the citizens
themselves with all the power of a second legislative body.189 The
opposition focused on the importance of tradition and the dignity of
bicameralism with the federal government and all Arizona’s sister states.
“This system of government was thought best by the men who framed
our national constitution . . . that sacred document,”190 editorialized one
major newspaper. Another newspaper claimed that unicameralism
would “make Arizona the laughing stock of her neighbors or a scarecrow
for capital.”191 The modeling of the federal system carried the day over
the call for more radical democracy in Arizona.

183. Dinan, supra note 170, at 946–47.
184. Dinan, supra note 170, at 960.
185. Dinan, supra note 170, at 960.
186. Kim Robak, The Nebraska Unicameral and Its Lasting Benefits, 76 NEB. L. REV. 791, 793 n.9
(1997).
187. James R. Rogers, Judicial Review Standards in Unicameral Legislative Systems: A Positive
Theoretic and Historical Analysis, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 65, 70 (1999).
188. Anthony Tsontakis, The Arizona Senate Suicide Attempt of 1912, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 2012, at
40, 43–46. The House debates were largely satirical, with that body never taking seriously the idea of
unicameralism. Before voting down the bill, the House passed amendments to permanently
disenfranchise all sitting Senators, to move the state capital to the state penitentiary, and to redraft
the bill in the form of poetry rather than legislative language. Id. at 44–46.
189. Id. at 41.
190. Id. at 43.
191. Id. at 44.
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Only one state enacted unicameralism in the early 20th century:
Nebraska, in a 1934 referendum. Senator George Norris, the leading
advocate for unicameralism, believed that the two-house system was a
relic of the English class system, with its Commons and Lords, and
inappropriate for a fully democratic and ostensibly class-free American
society.192 He also believed that bicameralism introduced a secretive and
unaccountable step in the legislative process when the two chambers met
in conference to resolve their differences, that efficient businesslike
operations demanded unicameralism (no corporation would have two
boards of directors) and that having two chambers was, if nothing else,
costly and wasteful.193 The opposition once again cited tradition, calling
the plan “un-American,” and argued that a unicameral legislature would
pass too much legislation.194 The passage of the plan sparked renewed
interest in unicameralism¾12 state legislatures considered
unicameralism in 1935 and 21 legislatures did so in 1937¾but only
Nebraska adopted it.195 To this day, Nebraskans mark their Unicameral
a point of pride. They considered placing it on their state quarter196 and
leading politicians describe it in the same breath as college football and
as having an “almost mystical quality.”197 Nebraskans see their
legislature, like “[c]ity councils and county and school boards,” as a way
to provide deliberation without a “redundancy that slows the process,”
and as adequately checked by the governor.198 State reports have also
touted the direct cost savings from paying fewer legislators.199
The states continue to debate the merits of unicameralism
periodically. Alaska seriously considered unicameralism in its 1956
constitutional convention, but it was concerned with how
Congress¾then debating Alaskan statehood¾would view its “political
maturity.”200 A two-house legislature was seen as more familiar to

192. Robak, supra note 186, at 795–96. But see Rogers, supra note 187, at 76–77 (noting that
historically, American bicameralism did not have its roots in the British class system but was rather
“thoroughly republicanized”).
193. Robak, supra note 186, at 795–97.
194. Robak, supra note 186, at 799.
195. Rogers, supra note 187, at 72.
196. Jonathan S. Ross, A New Answer for an Old Question: Should Alaska Once Again Consider
A Unicameral Legislature?, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 257, 279 (2010) (citing Scott Bauer, Heineman to
Receive Final State Quarter Designs Next Week, LINCOLN JOURNAL-STAR, Apr. 26, 2005, at 1).
197. Robak, supra note 186, at 791–92.
198. Robak, supra note 186, 807–08, 816.
199. Ross, supra note 196, at 277 (citing Roger V. Shumate, The Nebraska Unicameral
Legislature, 5 W. POL. Q. 504, 506 (1952)).
200. Michael Schwaiger, Understanding the Unoriginal: Indeterminant Originalism and
Independent Interpretation of the Alaska Constitution, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 293, 310 (2005) (quoting
Gerald A. McBeath & Thomas A. Morehousoe, ALASKA POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 121 (1994)); see also
Ross, supra note 196, at 258.
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Congress, more “ordinary,” and was ultimately adopted.201 At least
fourteen states considered unicameralism in the 1990s.202 California’s
Constitution Revision Commission, for example, recommended
unicameralism in 1995, although it later reversed itself.203 Yet
bicameralism remains firmly entrenched as the legislative form for fortynine states.204
This history of bicameralism offers important insights into local
government’s contrasting unicameralism. First, the states show that
bicameralism is not merely a relic of the founding, locked into place by
the strictures of Article V. States chose bicameralism just as local
governments chose unicameralism. In some sense, federal bicameralism
needs no explanation. It exists for principled reasons, as described in the
introduction, but it also reflects a brute political compromise between
large and small states. Turning to unicameralism would still require
either large or small states to lose their influence, depending on which
chamber was retained, and as such it is nearly impossible to imagine how
the votes for such an amendment could be mustered.
In contrast, state constitutions are sites of constant and deep
change. “State constitutional amendments are frequent, if not
routine.”205 One analysis of state constitutional amendments from 1999
counted over 230 state conventions and over 6000 amendments to state
constitutions.206 In some states, the amendment process is particularly
easy or common. In Colorado, for example, it is no more difficult to enact
a constitutional amendment by initiative than it is to enact a statute, and
the result has been more than 150 amendments over a period of 138
years.207 Alabama has the world’s longest constitution, inflated in size by
201. Ross, supra note 196, at 258. Early advocates of Alaskan unicameralism felt that Congress
was too “bound by tradition” and unappreciative of “experimental democracy.” Ross, supra note 196,
at 260 (citing JEANETTE P. NICHOLS, ALASKA: A HISTORY OF ITS ADMINISTRATION, EXPLOITATION, AND
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT DURING ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY UNDER THE RULE OF THE UNITED STATES
403 (1923)).
202. Rogers, supra note 187, at 73–74.
203. Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past? The Increasing
Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 HOFSTRA L. POL’Y SYMP. 1, 18
n.69 (1996); Rogers, supra note 187, at 74.
204. For additional accounts of states considering unicameralism, see Dan Friedman, Magnificent
Failure Revisited: Modern Maryland Constitutional Law from 1967 to 1998, 58 MD. L. REV. 528, 549
n.115 (1999) (a Maryland commission deciding against a “modern” unicameral model by a single vote);
Fritz Snyder, Montana’s Top Document: Its Transition into the 21st Century, MONT. LAW, Aug./Sept.
2009, at 8.
205. Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism and the Domain of Normative Theory, 37 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 523, 528 (2000).
206. Dinan, supra note 170, at 935 (citing G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Politics: An Historical
Perspective, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND
HISTORICAL PATTERNS 3 (1996)).
207. Jim Griesemer, Colorado Should Say “No” to Constitutional Amendments, DENVER POST
(Oct. 24, 2014, 10:38 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2014/10/24/colorado-should-say-no-toconstitutional-amendments/.
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890 amendments as of 2015.208 Unlike federal constitutionalism, a
resistance to formal amendment does not mark state
constitutionalism.209
Since no procedural obstacle to unicameralism exists at the state
level, in the form of either general hurdles to constitutional amendment
or special protections for bicameralism,210 there must instead be a
substantive distinction drawn between states and localities.211 A choice
has been made to treat the two levels of government differently, a choice
which must reflect something about each. As a delegate to Massachusetts’
Progressive Era constitutional convention put it, in rejecting the
relevance of local unicameral structures to the state’s own system, “[a]
city government is not a Legislature.”212
Second, the debates over state legislative structure essentially
marshalled the same arguments as those over local legislative structure.
Efficiency and democracy were laid against tradition, the federal analogy,
and the importance of checks and balances.213 What differed was the
weight placed on each of those values. Citizens and legislators, at least
after the Revolutionary period, worried more about constraining
potentially oppressive state government and less about unshackling
states from burdensome supermajority requirements. States also highly
valued the stature imparted by mirroring the federal structure¾in

208. Lorelei Laird, Supersized Alabamans Are Readying Yet Another Effort to Reform the State’s
Famously Long Constitution, ABA J., Mar. 2015, at 12.
209. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV .
549, 590 (2009) (describing difficulty of Article V amendment process and shift to alternative forms
of constitutional change).
210. See Rodriguez, supra note 205, at 528 (identifying state constitutional amendments, unlike
federal constitutional amendments, as concerning “fundamental” features of government, including
unicameralism).
211. It is notable that this line was drawn differently in the United States than in most other federal
systems. While most federations have bicameral national legislatures, “unicameralism is increasingly
the norm in subnational constitutions.” John Dinan, Patterns of Subnational Constitutionalism in
Federal
Countries,
39
RUTGERS
L.J.
837,
841
(2008).
As
of
2001,
only
seventy-three state legislatures across the world were bicameral out of 450, with the long-term trend
towards subnational unicameralism. Id. at 857 (citing Louis Massicotte, Legislative Unicameralism:
A Global Survey and a Few Case Studies, 7 J. LEGIS. STUD. 151, 151 (2001)). For example, while five
Canadian provinces once had bicameral legislatures, none do today, and the last German bicameral
state, Bavaria, turned to unicameralism in 1998. Dinan, supra, at 858. Many national constitutions
require subnational bicameralism, while other states have been given the choice and opted for
bicameralism. Dinan, supra, at 857. Australia is the only other country with largely bicameral state
government. Dinan, supra, at 859. Perhaps this is so because Australian state constitutions are both
important symbolic documents (therefore resistant to change) and were originally limited to
bicameralism due to British legislation. Cheryl Saunders, Australian State Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS
L.J. 999, 1002, 1011 (2000).
212. Dinan, supra note 170, at 962.
213. One argument common among proponents of local bicameralism¾the virtue of a larger
legislature¾was not relevant at the state level, given the generally larger size of state legislative
chambers.
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Alaska and Arizona this issue appeared decisive214¾while local
governments quickly moved away from federally inspired structures.
Likewise, those who saw their polity, state or local, as sharing
fundamental interests embraced unicameralism, but as time went on, the
illusion of homogeneity was easier to maintain at the local level than in
large states.
Third, and most importantly, states saw local governments as a form
apart, different in kind from themselves and the federal government.
States drew the federal analogy upwards, but they did not extend it
down¾states neither thought that local governments ought to be
structured like the federal government nor like themselves. Local
government was distinct and needed a distinct structure to match.
Indeed, insofar as it was sometimes state legislatures imposing
unicameralism on cities directly, it was often the very same entity
selecting different forms for the two levels of government. In choosing
bicameralism for themselves and unicameralism for local governments,
the states determined that local governments should not merely be
miniature states, but rather take their own shape.
II. WHY ARE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNICAMERAL?
Legislators and voters alike distinguished between state and local
governments, consistently converging upon bicameral legislatures for
the former and unicameral legislatures for the latter.215 Any equivalence
between the two levels of government was rejected. Local governments
were meant to further different values and given the legislative structure
to do so effectively. But why?
Presumably, efficiency, modernization, democratic vigor, and cost
savings all provide benefits for state government¾all things being
equal¾and tradition, deliberation, and checks and balances do the same
at the local level. To understand why local governments adopted
unicameralism, while states did not, it is necessary to identify features
shared by all local governments that distinguish them from the states,
214. See supra notes 188-191, 200-201 and accompanying text.
215. James Gardner has identified the convergence of state governments on substantially identical
structures¾including bicameral legislatures¾as an important and unexplored feature of American
constitutionalism. James A. Gardner, Autonomy and Isomorphism: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Structural Autonomy in American State Constitutions, 60 WAYNE L. R EV. 31, 33–35 (2014). This
Article makes a similar claim with respect to local constitutional convergence. However, Gardner’s
conclusions are either inapplicable to local governments (while states might all coordinate around the
federal model, id. at 44, local governments have not) or unpersuasive in context. Gardner suggests
that structural convergence stems from easy access to information about standard government
structures, id. at 65, but this seems to minimize the reasoned debates that occurred over bicameralism,
the lengthy period of time over which change occurred, and the remaining diversity of local forms on
issues other than unicameralism. This Part provides its own explanations for the analogous
convergence of local structures.
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and which make these particular governmental virtues particularly
attractive.
This section examines the features of local government that made
unchecked majoritarianism so much more appealing at that level. Two
explanations focus on local government’s position in an
intergovernmental system: first, the constraints imposed by higher levels
of government and by interlocal competition, which offer some insurance
against disastrous government action; and second, the internal
homogeneity driven by residents who sort themselves into preferred
towns and cities, which drives demand for swift majoritarianism. The
executive-focused nature of local government¾which plays a
proportionally smaller role in regulation and a larger role in
administration
compared
to
the
state
and
federal
governments¾provides two other explanations. At the local level,
unicameralism allows legislatures to more effectively check and balance
executives. Additionally, local executives have not only greater
institutional power than local legislatures, but also greater symbolic
resonance. Local legislatures are more purely instrumental than state
and federal legislatures, and thus easier to restructure; sentiment and
tradition do not stand in the way.
A. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IS CONSTRAINED¾BUT IT ISN’T WEAK
A tempting explanation for local unicameralism is that local
governments are weak and in no need of checks and balances.216
Undoubtedly, this provides part of the explanation. Interlocal
competition and state oversight217 each help assure residents that, even
without the brake of a second chamber, their local government cannot do
too much harm. But local powerlessness cannot be the full story. For
while these forces limit local government power relative to state or
national governments, in an absolute sense, local governments retain an
enormous ability to impose terrible costs on voters. All evidence suggests
that residents care intensely about the choices of their local governments.
They do not feel that they can trust either the political marketplace or the
state legislature to entirely defang local governments. Thus, the legal
weaknesses of local government provide only the beginnings of an
explanation for local unicameralism.

216. See Levmore, supra note 44, at 161 (“The imposition of external costs requires a captive set of
losers, and these are . . . most difficult to find from the vantage point of City Hall.”).
217. Federal oversight also protects against abuses by local government. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2015). However, this is true for state governments and does not explain what leads to a distinctively
local form of government.
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The tale of legally helpless local governments has a long scholarly
lineage.218 On the one hand, many local government law scholars see
local governments as disempowered by state constitutions, which render
local governments entirely subordinate to the states219 and confine them
to delegated powers interpreted narrowly under Dillon’s Rule.220 On the
other hand, political scientists working in the public choice tradition,
most famously Paul Peterson, have argued that local government is so
constrained by interlocal competition that it can only exercise a small
fraction of the power that it holds.221 In particular, they argue that local
governments cannot pursue redistributive policies.222 Because citizens
will move to another town if they are taxed to pay for services that they
do not receive¾or even for services that they value at less than the bill
they pay for it¾they claim that it is effectively impossible to sustain any
policies that do not benefit all taxpaying, mobile residents.223
Both of these claims have been hotly contested, however, and
debates over the extent of local power continue with full force.224 I need
not wade deeply into that debate. Legally, local governments are
relatively weaker than states¾no one contests this. And each story of
local powerlessness offers residents at least some reason not to fear their
local government.
From the public choice perspective, Tiebout competition (on which
Peterson’s model is based) offers residents some security from local
abuse. Charles Tiebout’s famous theory of interlocal competition
218. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I¾The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1990) (describing “traditional account of local legal powerlessness”).
219. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907):
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to
them . . . the state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may
take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand
or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality,
repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or
unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.
220. See, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism,
147 U. PA. L. R EV. 487, 506–09 (1999); Briffault, supra note 218, at 8; see also GERALD E. FRUG
& DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 4 (2008); Gerald Frug, The
City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1109–13 (1980).
221. See, e.g., PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981); Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution,
Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2007) (describing
“conventional wisdom that localities should play little role in fulfilling the redistributive functions of
government”).
222. Gillette, supra note 221, at 1058.
223. Gillette, supra note 221, at 1058.
224. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the
Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 489–91 (2009) (describing debate over constraints on city
power and ultimately arguing that urban areas could show renewed autonomy). See generally Kasim
Reed, Progressive Cities: Innovative Solutions to Urban Problems, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 219 (2013)
(arguing for assertive and progressive local government and introducing symposium on that subject).
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imagines local governments as fighting for residents and firms by selling
bundles of public services for the “price” of the local tax rate.225 Residents
and firms, the consumers in the location market, migrate to those
jurisdictions that best match their preferences for services and taxes.226
Though the model is highly stylized and in its pure form requires
implausible assumptions about the mobility of residents and the
information available to them,227 the Tiebout model captures important
dynamics shaping local government.228
In a Tiebout world, interlocal competition serves as a check on local
power, not an outright bar on its exercise. For example, in a Tiebout
analysis, cities can (and do)229 pursue redistribution and other policies
that a rigid Petersonian public choice perspective might suggest are near
impossible, so long as self-sorted residents are willing to pay for those
policies. More importantly, there are many limits to Tiebout
competition’s disciplining power. Those without the wherewithal to
relocate¾people of color facing residential discrimination, for example,
or low-income people who cannot afford the up-front costs of moving,
expensive suburban housing, or an automobile necessary to leave a
center city¾cannot impose “market” discipline on their local
governments.230 Likewise, those whose tax payments are less than their
service consumption, and who therefore impose a fiscal cost on local
governments, are undesirable from a fiscal perspective; local
governments may actively avoid satisfying their preferences.231 Without
the power to vote with their feet, these groups are inadequately protected
by Tiebout competition.
Even so, Tiebout competition checks at least certain exercises of
local power and therefore arguably makes intra-legislative checks and
balances less important. Residents can check their local legislatures not
only by voting for and lobbying the members of a second chamber but
also by voting with their feet¾or credibly threatening to do so. That
225. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 422 (1956).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 419 (listing assumptions); Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model,
71 AM. ECON. R EV. 93, 93 (1981) (“The pure [Tiebout] model, however, involves a set of assumptions
so patently unrealistic as to verge on the outrageous.”).
228. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 511–28 (1991) (observing empirical
evidence that jurisdictions in fact compete for residents with service/tax packages); David Schleicher,
The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1508 (2010) (observing empirical
evidence that local policies are “capitalized” into housing prices).
229. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND
THE COURTS xi (2011).
230. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II¾Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 420–21 (1990) (describing barriers to mobility).
231. See Vicki Been, Comment on Professor Jerry Frug’s The Geography of Community,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1996) (describing practice of fiscal zoning and collecting sources).
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threat, of course, is only rarely credible at the state or national level; it is
relatively more costly for an individual or firm to move across state lines
or abroad than to move within their current region, where they have
established social and economic networks.232 Tiebout competition’s
greater force at the local level helps explain why a second legislative
chamber is considered less necessary at the local level than for states and
the federal government.
Likewise, state control of local governments theoretically offers
meaningful protections to worried residents. State governments already
limit the powers of local government, variously empowering and
constraining cities, towns and counties in manners that shape what ends
local governments can pursue.233 In addition to that static structuring of
local government’s powers, states can intervene in local affairs at will,
whether in one-off decisions or broader limitations of local power.
Depending on the form of home rule, state legislatures have the power to
preempt between some and all of a local government’s actions.234 As a
practical matter, states can overrule nearly any local decision they find
troubling.235 And states use this power constantly.236
Should a local government enact patently unwise legislation, in most
cases residents could petition the state government to undo it. More
commonly, when a local government enacts controversial legislation, the
losing side can also petition the state government, where their allies
might constitute a majority, to pull rank.237 In either situation, the state
legislature serves as a counterweight against local power: Rather than a
second chamber whose concurrent assent is necessary for legislation to

232. See Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1353 (2014) (“Naturally, the costs
of, and job barriers to, switching governmental providers are lowered when the relevant government
is smaller.”); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 274 (1997)
(“Competition for residents is more likely among localities within a state, or states within a federation,
than among nation states.”).
233. See generally FRUG & BARRON, supra note 220.
234. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1126–27 (2007) (discussing varieties
of home rule and noting difficulties of precisely categorizing or quantifying each variety, given stateby-state distinctions).
235. David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 392 (2001)
(“[H]ardly any impediments to the exercise of state power vis-à-vis local governments exist in state
constitutional law.”).
236. See Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 254
(2004) (collecting cases “from local tobacco and firearm regulation, to gay and lesbian rights, and
domestic partnership ordinances, to campaign finance reform measures, and ‘living wage’ laws”).
237. Shaila Dewan, States Are Blocking Local Regulations, Often at Industry’s Behest, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
23,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/us/govern-yourselves-state-law
makers-tell-cities-but-not-too-much.html?_r=0 (“[P]re-empting the power of local governments is
becoming a standard part of the legislative playbook in many states where Republicans who control
statehouses are looking to block or overturn the actions of . . . municipalities that are often more
liberal.”).
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pass, the state legislature retains the option of vetoing (or modifying) the
local legislation.
As with interjurisdictional competition, preemption affects local
governments more than states. First, both states and the federal
government can preempt local governments, while only one body can
preempt states.238 Second, home rule provisions, even where they
provide some protections to local government, rarely have the heft of the
national constitution’s protections for federalism.239 In the wake of the
Rehnquist Court’s revival of federalism doctrines,240 there are renewed
protections for states, ranging from canons of statutory interpretation241
to sovereign immunity doctrines.242 While home rule has its own
jurisprudence, its protections are generally considered not nearly as
strong.243 With local legislation easier to preempt than state legislation,
bicameralism should be less necessary at the local level.
But local government’s relative powerlessness is not enough to
explain local unicameralism. In an absolute sense, local governments
remain extremely powerful. They routinely take actions that might seem
to require checking and balancing. The Department of Justice’s
investigation into police practices in Ferguson, Missouri, for example,
found that local policies treated residents “less as constituents to be
protected than as potential offenders and sources of revenue,” and were
pervaded with “deeply embedded constitutional deficiencies,” including
systematic harassment, racial discrimination and violence.244 Of course,
those deficiencies ended in the death of a teenager at the hands of local
police and a violent confrontation between Ferguson residents and
Ferguson police.245 The images of tanks, tear gas, and incendiary devices

238. Diller, supra note 234, at 1114.
239. See Barron, supra note 235, at 392 (describing home rule provisions “mini-Tenth
Amendments” that are supposed to defend against state assertions of preemptive power, but which
are rarely construed as such by state courts).
240. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 430–33 (2002) (summarizing federalism trends in constitutional
law and statutory interpretation).
241. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991).
242. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
243. For example, David Barron observes that there are “state constitutional prohibitions against
special legislation that may limit a state’s capacity to regulate a particular city, but these often are
honored in the breach.” Barron, supra note 235, at 392 n.35. See Briffault, supra note 236, at 257
(“Even within state systems, home rule does not change the fact that local governments are creatures
of state law.”). Of course, given the wild diversity of forms of home rule, it is dangerous to generalize.
Barron, supra note 235, at 253 (finding that home rule doctrines “vary[] from state to state, and even
within a state”).
244. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIV. RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT
2, 6 (2015).
245. See Wesley Lowery, Police Use Tear Gas On Crowd In Ferguson, Mo., Protesting Teen’s
Death, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/
08/12/police-use-tear-gas-on-crowd/?utm_term=.5279a1a70423.
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being used by police made painfully clear that local governments are not
entirely impotent. Neither state supervision nor the mobility of black
residents prevented the Ferguson government from exercising power in
its
rawest
form.
Local
control
over police¾sovereignty
instantiated246¾is enough, on its own, to reject any blanket claims of
local incapacity.247
Policing is not the only area in which local governments remain
powerful. Richard Briffault has noted that local governments have the
dominant role in setting education and land use policy in this country,
and that, as a practical matter, the courts have guarded that local role
even against constitutional claims of equality and individual rights.248
These policies in turn affect residents’ lifelong economic opportunity,
social mobility, and physical and mental health in ways that social
scientists are only just beginning to uncover.249 Exclusionary land use
policies, set overwhelmingly by local governments, have been estimated
to cost the U.S. economy $1.95 trillion250 and at the individual level, the
personal devastation wrought upon the losers in the housing market can
be incalculable.251
Moreover, residents are acutely aware of the importance of their
local governments, participating frequently and deeply in order to assure
that the right decisions are reached. They do not trust competition or
their state representatives alone to protect them. Research shows that
between eleven percent and twenty-five percent of people, depending on
the size of the jurisdiction, attend community board meetings, and
between twenty-five percent and forty percent of people contact their

246. See Noah M. Kazis, Special Districts, Sovereignty, and the Structure of Local Police Services,
48 URB. LAW. 417 (2016) (describing special connection between local governments, policing and
sovereignty).
247. See Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
1409 (2001) (describing importance of local governments in criminal law).
248. Briffault, supra note 218, at 112.
249. For a summary of the recent “neighborhood effects” literature, see Barbara Sard & Douglas
Rice, Realizing the Housing Voucher Program’s Potential to Enable Families to Move to Better
Neighborhoods, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL. PRIORITIES (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/research/
housing/realizing-the-housing-voucher-programs-potential-to-enable-families-to-move-to.
Particularly important recent studies include PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013); Raj Chetty et al., The
Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to
Opportunity Experiment, 106 AM. ECON. REV . 855 (2016); Raj Chetty et al., Where Is the Land of
Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q. J. OF ECON.
1553 (2014).
250. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Why Do Cities Matter? Local Growth and Aggregate
Growth, at 3 (Kreisman Working Paper Series in Housing Law and Policy, Paper No. 21154, Apr. 2015),
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/housing_law_and_policy/36/.
251. See generally MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
(2016) (providing quantitative and qualitative sociology of the eviction process in low-income
communities).
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local officials.252 Impassioned neighbors pack zoning hearings to register
their opposition to nearby developments.253 The felt importance of local
government to its residents is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that
eighty-nine percent of parents of K-12 students surveyed in 2007 said
that they had attended a school or PTA meeting since the start of the
school year, a level of involvement in governance unimaginable in state
or federal agencies.254 Local government is not simply allowed to be
unicameral because the stakes are low, either from the perspective of
policymakers or residents.255 Local governments exercise deadly
force¾and local legislatures set policies governing the use of that force.
That alone makes local governments powerful enough that structural
constraints on local power, like bicameralism, might be deemed
necessary. Something more is necessary to explain why unicameralism,
instead, is preferred.256
B. TIEBOUT SORTING AND SUBURBAN UNICAMERALISM
Tiebout competition likely plays a second important function in
explaining local unicameralism: By sorting residents into relatively
homogeneous communities, it fosters political environments eager for
majoritarianism. The dominant political blocs in any particular
jurisdiction¾and in particular, “homevoters” in the suburbs¾can

252. J. Eric Oliver, City Size and Civic Involvement in Metropolitan America, 94 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 361, 365 (2000); see also Mike Maciag, The Citizens Most Vocal in Local Government,
GOVERNING (July 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-national-survey-showscitizens-most-vocal-active-in-local-government.html (reporting survey data showing that 19 percent
of Americans recently contacted their local elected officials and twenty-four percent attended a public
meeting).
253. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS.
& URBAN DEV., “NOT IN MY BACKYARD”: REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 1–8 (1991)
(“NIMBY groups . . . can be very effective at packing hearing rooms and leaving the impression that
public opinion is strongly against whatever project they oppose.”); Morton Gitelman, The Role of the
Neighbors in Zoning Cases, 28 ARK. L. REV. 221, 221 (1974) (“[T]he petitions will invariably be
circulated and the angry neighbors will crowd the room at the hearing glowering at planning
commissioners or councilmen and muttering curses at the petitioner.”).
254. Chuck Dervarics & Eileen O’Brien, Back to School: How Parent Involvement Affects Student
Achievement, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC. (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.centerforpubliceducation
.org/Main-Menu/Public-education/Parent-Involvement/Parent-Involvement.html.
255. See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The
Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 422–23, 432–36 (2007) (rejecting Peterson’s vision of
powerless and depoliticized local government and describing broad range of ideological issues which
local government must address).
256. Another argument which may tempt, but which does not stand up to scrutiny, is that local
unicameralism represents a commitment to equal representation at the local level: that bicameralism
involves a second, more malapportioned chamber (like the U.S. Senate) and that turning to
unicameralism represents a move toward fairness. But local unicameralism coexisted with gross
inequalities in representation for a century. Avery v. Midland County, the case which first applied
one-person one-vote to local government, concerned a five-member, unicameral county commission
where one district contained 414 residents and another 67,906. 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968).

KAZIS-69.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1188

5/26/18 12:49 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:1147

confidently embrace legislative capacity, secure in the knowledge that
they and their like-minded neighbors will be the ones to benefit. Like
Progressive Era advocates of state unicameralism, residents of a Tieboutsorted town want a legislative structure that can consistently effectuate
the majority’s demands: they demand the vigor of unicameralism, not the
constraint of bicameralism.
In the Tiebout model, mobility has (at least) two separate effects.257
The first, already discussed, is forward-looking. It stems from the threat
of future mobility: Local governments must cater to people and
businesses that can leave if dissatisfied. The second arises from the past
fact of mobility. Since local governments do offer different bundles of
taxes and services, residents over time arrange themselves into the
localities that best satisfy their preferences. Although limits on
residential mobility limit the amount of sorting that takes place, in the
aggregate, local governments take on a more homogeneous cast than the
region or state in which they are situated.
There is substantial, although not entirely uniform, empirical
evidence that Tiebout sorting in fact occurs.258 For example, one
influential study found that Michigan municipalities were more
homogeneous in areas with more local governments for residents to
choose between.259 Although much sorting takes place on the basis of
wealth, not political preferences,260 both shape the composition of local
jurisdictions. The result is at least some degree of homogeneity among
local voters: some rough consensus on what aims their local government
should pursue.
257. Indeed, this is an oversimplification. This paragraph’s sketch of the Tiebout model draws on
Wallace Oates’ much more thorough review of this complex literature, which describes the many
varieties of theoretical and empirical research arising out of the Tiebout framework. Wallace E. Oates,
The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS
IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 21 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006).
258. David Schleicher, I Would, But I Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit nor Voice Substantially
Limits Big City Corruption, 42 LOY. U. C HI. L.J. 277, 280 (2011) (“[T]here is substantial evidence that
sorting does occur.”); Keith Dowding et al., Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature,
31 URB. STUD. 767, 787 (“[A]n impressive array of evidence suggests that the Tiebout family of models
holds a number of important truths about urban politics.”).
259. Edward M. Gramlich & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Micro Estimates of Public Spending Demand
Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses, 90 J. POL. ECON. 536 (1982)
(finding greater homogeneity in metropolitan areas with more local governments and more
opportunities for sorting).
260. Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 638 (2002) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL
FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001)) (“[T]he charming image of Tieboutian foot-shoppers
choosing from different bundles of goods and services based on their individual preferences begins to
be supplanted by the somewhat less charming image of community choice based primarily on the
number of investment dollars that each citizen-consumer holds.”); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV . 23, 31 (1998) (“People who live in unsafe neighborhoods or send their children to
inadequate schools don’t do so because they have taste for them. They do so because they feel they
have no other choice.”).
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This homogeneity is sharpened by the dominance of a particular
type of citizen in local politics: the “homevoter.”261 A species first
identified by William Fischel, the homevoter is motivated to participate
in local politics by her need to protect the (uninsurable) value of her
home from disadvantageous land use or taxation decisions, which are
capitalized into housing prices.262 There is a rough consensus that the
homevoter controls governance in suburban politics,263 and the
homevoter has recently been gaining power in large cities as well.264
Homevoter power stems first and foremost from numerical superiority.
Homeowners substantially outnumber renters in the suburbs and
commonly use their power in local politics to exclude new renters.265
Homevoters also have access to informal sources of power, rooted in
social ties in a small community and a compelling cost-benefit calculus
for participation.266 Indeed, homevoters are considered so powerful that
they can effectively control local governments without even needing to
vote.267
The combination of Tiebout sorting and homevoter dominance
within those already homogenous jurisdictions produces a strong
foundation for local unicameralism. It is a truism that local politics are
usually more majoritarian, and less protective of minorities, than larger
polities.268 But bicameralism, and checks and balances more generally,
are rooted in a distrust of government action. Bicameralism is meant
both to slow the pace of lawmaking generally and in particular to slow

261. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001).
262. Id.
263. Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth
Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 227, 229 (2014). Id. at 235 (summarizing empirical research as
mostly consistent with the homevoter theory). But see Richard Schragger, Consuming Government,
101 MICH. L. REV. 1824 (2003) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW
HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES
(2001)) (contesting homevoter hypothesis).
264. Been et al., supra note 264, at 229 (“We find a surprising level of empirical support for the
homevoter-based theory, even though New York City is probably the last place in the United States
that one would expect to see zoning policy catering to the interests of homeowners . . . .”).
265. Fennell, supra note 261, at 629.
266. Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the
Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1648–50 (2006).
267. Id. at 1649 (“There is little need for the majority of homeowners to vote if all of the available
choices in a local election are likely to serve their fundamental interests.”).
268. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
86 YALE L.J. 385, 405 (1977) (arguing that “[s]mall municipalities combine the majoritarian building
blocks of single issues and few voters[,]” and tracing idea back to Madison); Serkin, supra note 267,
at 1645 (“Received wisdom suggests that, unlike the state and federal governments, local governments
are majoritarian.”); Carol M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 1681, 1686 (2007) (describing conventional wisdom that local governments more likely to
“gang up” on permanent minorities). But see Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1745, 1748 (2005) (pointing out that national minorities may be local majorities).
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majoritarian lawmaking. As such, bicameralism offers little to
homogeneous, homevoter-dominated local governments. Homevoters
can rest secure, knowing that they control their local governments and
that, in any case, their neighbors already agree with them about what
matters. Given that control, homevoters should want a mechanism for
reliable and uninterrupted translation of their preferences into policy.269
Unicameralism, not bicameralism, gives homevoters in homogeneous
communities what they want.
This explanation for local unicameralism also explains why
suburban unicameralism is so deeply entrenched. Suburbs are smaller,
allowing greater differentiation across jurisdictions and therefore
additional sorting.270 Suburbs, due to their higher homeownership rates,
are also more dominated by homevoters, assuring a tighter identity of
interest among members of the majority.271
Another way of looking at it is that due to homevoter power, local
governments generally, and suburbs in particular, exemplify the qualities
that advocates of state unicameralism emphasized in their own
arguments. While believing that societies have fundamentally shared
interests may have been a misguided bit of Whig ideology when applied
to the entire state of Pennsylvania at the Founding,272 that belief might
well reflect reality along the Main Line. And while popular participation
might not constitute “bicameralism from below” at the state level,273 the
omnipresent oversight of the homevoter really does help govern suburbs.
Finally, suburbanites really do demand active government protection
from “private aggression,”274 albeit in the form of “out-of-scale”
development rather than the monopolies feared in the Progressive Era.
Notably, local powerlessness¾whether from Interlocal competition
or state control¾does not explain the special affinity of suburbs for
unicameralism. As Richard Briffault has demonstrated, local autonomy
is at its peak in the suburbs.275 Legislatures and courts alike have been
solicitous of suburban power to resist urban demands for integration,
particularly in the areas of education and land use, and suburbs have
successfully raised walls around their own resource bases.276 If

269. In a truly homogeneous polity, the challenges of bicameralism are easily overcome, as the two
chambers are likely to agree. The costs of bicameralism are therefore diminished in this context,
arguably making it once again more appealing. But in that case, bicameralism offers nothing but a
procedural hurdle to clear, if an easy one. Why bother?
270. See Gramlich & Rubinfeld, supra note 260.
271. See Been et al., supra note 264.
272. See Williams, supra note 176 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
275. See generally Briffault, supra note 219; Briffault, supra note 231.
276. Briffault, supra note 231, at 355:
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bicameralism existed only to serve as a check on empowered legislatures,
one might expect to see a greater openness to it in suburbia. But the
opposite is true. This suggests that bicameralism is not driven only by a
demand for checks and balances.
Rather, bicameralism’s purpose is to provide checks and balances in
the specific context of diversity, in order to protect disparate groups
within a single polity.277 Such diversity is present at the national and state
levels, and generally in large cities as well, and thus bicameralism is more
valued in those places. Bicameralism’s specific variety of checks and
balances is not necessary in the more homogeneous suburbs. Thanks to
Tiebout sorting, suburban power and suburban unicameralism can
comfortably coexist. Local autonomy allows suburbs to create
communities of shared interests and then to assertively protect those
communities against outside demands. Since this sort of suburban
power, as identified by Briffault, is employed for the benefit of residents
against non-residents, voters do not seek to check that power (why would
they?) but rather to enhance it.278
Put differently, suburban power has substantial negative
externalities, but its internalized effects are generally positive.279 The
potential losers of suburban policymaking do not reside in the relevant
jurisdictions, and their concerns are muffled or redirected as a result. In
The core of local legal autonomy is defensive and preservative, enabling residents of more
affluent localities to devote local taxable resources to local ends, exclude unwanted land
uses and users and protect the autonomous local political structure that allows them to
pursue local policies . . . . Suburbs benefit from the localist values of courts and legislatures
that discourage modifications of this highly satisfactory status quo and protect them from
outside interference.
277. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948–51 (1983) (describing one purpose of bicameralism
as preventing minority factions¾a relevant concern only where minority and majority groups coexist
in the first place).
278. Admittedly, state legislatures, in which all groups are represented, provide the menu of
legislative structures under general-law incorporation. I assume in this section that suburban interests
dominate the state legislatures, as is overwhelmingly true in American politics, and that they are able
to coordinate on this issue. See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity,
and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1538 (2007) (“Legislatures in most states are
heavily dominated by suburban majorities . . . .”). I describe suburban jurisdictions, rather than the state
legislature, as selecting unicameralism for simplicity of argument: It might be more precise to say that
suburban jurisdictions select unicameralism through the state legislatures.
279. See Briffault, supra note 231 at 355. There are many examples of these externalities. Suburban
autonomy over land use policies causes environmentally destructive suburban sprawl, see David J.
Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2263 (2003) (“[T]he current form of home
rule directs local power in a way that fuels sprawl.”); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Trouble Preserving
Paradise, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 161–62 (2001) (cataloguing environmental harms of sprawl);
economically inefficient regional growth, see John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 91 (2014); and unjust exclusion of disadvantaged social groups from opportunity, see
e.g. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE
UNDERCLASS (1993)¾negative effects all felt outside suburban borders. In contrast, suburban autonomy
over education is used to protect educational outcomes for residents. See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise,
The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043 (2002).
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contrast, at the state and national level, where bicameralism reigns, most
legislative decisions are internalized; while there are winners and losers,
both groups tend to reside within the jurisdictional lines. State legislative
power appears more fearsome than suburban legislative
power¾although the latter can be immensely destructive¾because
suburbanites have already sorted themselves into communities with
relatively unified interests (or more precisely, in which supermajorities
share relatively unified interests).280
Thus, Tiebout provides not one but two explanations for local
unicameralism. On the one hand, the threat of exit disciplines local
governments, providing a substitute check to unicameral legislatures. On
the other, the fact of Tiebout sorting assures residents that the
unicameral legislature’s power will be used consistently for their own
benefit. Paradoxically, both local powerlessness and local power drive
local unicameralism.
C. CHECKS AND BALANCES IN AN EXECUTIVE-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT
So far, the explanations for local unicameralism have assumed that
bicameralism indeed promotes checks and balances¾as is generally
believed at the federal level. But that isn’t always so. Local government
is, at its heart, executive. Its programmatic focus on administration and
implementation means that, counterintuitively, unicameralism often
promotes a healthier system of checks and balances at the local level.
Bicameralism constrains government by making legislation more
difficult. But local governments’ role in our federalist system rests
primarily in administration and implementation, not legislation.281 Even
as local unicameralism paves the way for swift and efficient lawmaking,
it also allows the legislature to more effectively oversee the executive,
where, at the local level, real power operates.282
Local governance is lodged primarily in the executive branch: Local
governments are service providers.283 Public employment data make this
clear. In 2014, local governments employed over 10.5 million public

280. See Serkin, supra note 267, at 1628 (describing extent of externalities as “uniquely local”).
281. Cf. Lael R. Keiser, Why It Matters Whether State Bureaucrats as Opposed to Federal
Bureaucrats Administer Federal Programs, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN
THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY 207, 208 (George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2003)
(“[M]ost public policy is carried out at the state and local levels . . . .”) (emphasis added).
282. Notably, the previous sections emphasized zoning¾a quintessentially legislative local
function¾in showing how local governments seek efficiency in legislative design. Taxation and
budgeting might be another important example.
283. Mayor Fiorella LaGuardia famously announced that “[t]here is no Democratic or Republican
way to pick up garbage.” See Schleicher, supra note 20, at 421 & n.16.
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employees,284 while the states employed only 3.75 million people,285 and
the federal government employed 2.7 million civilian workers.286 While
no one would claim that local government has a dominant role in the
American system of policymaking, local government plays an outsize part
in on-the-ground policy implementation.287
This service delivery-focused role vests particular power in the
executive branch. The executive can manage public workers in a way that
legislatures simply cannot. Many of the most important local functions
operate at the level of personnel, not policy.288 No ordinance can
meaningfully delineate every step a teacher must take in responding to a
classroom disruption or an unexpected question from a student, for
example. Teachers are “street-level bureaucrats,” whose work is
necessarily difficult to supervise and dependent on individual
professional judgment.289 So are police, social workers, and many other
local employees.290 Broad legislative dictates govern the behavior of
public employees, of course, but direct management often plays a larger
role.291 Put differently, the superintendent has considerable advantages
over the school board. This further strengthens executive dominance as
a default condition of local government.
Thus, the distinct substantive tasks assigned to local government
demand a different conception of checks-and-balances: one far friendlier
to unicameralism.292 This vision of unicameralism-as-check-and-balance
is best illustrated by a city manager system. In many towns, cities and

284. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2014 ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT & PAYROLL, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL DATA: MARCH 2014 (2014).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. This shares themes with those who see local governments are as delegated implementers of
state policy, akin to state agencies. See, e.g., Aaron Saiger, Local Government as a Choice of Agency
Form, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 423 (2016).
288. Cf. Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments,
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 420 (1993) (“[M]ost–local governments in the United States are not
states-in-miniature, possessing broad decisionmaking authority over an array of public services and
issues, but are instead highly specialized bodies . . . charged with delivering public services . . . .”).
289. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES (1980).
290. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 57 (2011) (discussing “the difficulty of controlling the
inevitable discretion of the ‘street level bureaucrats’¾welfare caseworkers, police officers on the beat,
classroom teachers¾who make on-the-spot, face-to-face decisions that often determine the life
chances of citizens”).
291. See NORMA M. RICCUCCI, HOW MANAGEMENT MATTERS: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS AND
WELFARE REFORM (2005).
292. Unicameralism is not the only structural feature of local government that emphasizes checks
between the legislative and executive branches, rather than within the legislative branch. Many local actions,
such as rezonings, require concurrent action between executive bodies and the legislature, through processes
more involved and articulated than presentment and the veto power. See supra note 60 and accompanying
text.
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counties, a nonpartisan, unelected manager primarily oversees
government.293 The city manager is given carte blanche to run the daily
operations of government, subject only to the constraints imposed by the
elected council.294 Moreover, many of those daily operations come
preapproved by state legislation and need no local legislative
authorization.295 Thus, in the absence of legislative action, a manageroperated locality is not dormant, as the federal government would be
without Congressional action.296 Rather, the city manager would be
empowered to keep running the full panoply of local activities on her
own.
In a council-manager system, therefore, the additional veto point of
bicameralism does not prevent government action. Rather, bicameralism
simply increases the manager’s discretion. The baseline state of affairs is
continuing executive action, led by the manager. A divided legislature
might act slowly, or not at all, to respond to the manager’s actions,
however controversial. In contrast, a unicameral legislature is better able
to monitor and control the city manager. Bicameralism replaces state
action by elected legislators with action by a single unelected individual,
a person still able to control the police, the schools, the city planners, and
the other instruments of local government. This is not the libertarian
vision of inaction, or the democratic vision of deliberation, praised by
advocates of bicameralism.
Even in a strong mayor system, with an elected executive, the default
state of local government is action rather than inaction. Teachers will
keep teaching; police officers will keep responding to crimes. The
increased friction of bicameralism simply shifts power to the executive
branch, which will continue operating on its own terms without
legislative intercession.
Moreover, bicameralism interferes even with the informal methods
of governance that local legislatures have developed to manage
governments full of hard-to-regulate street-level bureaucrats. At the local
level, a substantial amount of legislative action takes the form of
intervention, not new policymaking. In part, this is because efforts at
novel local policymaking often are preempted by state governments or

293. See Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local
Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2572 (2006) (describing sign on desk of “weak
mayor” in a council-manager city: “The buck doesn’t stop here. See the city manager.”).
294. NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, MODEL CITY CHARTER § 3.04 (8th ed. 2003) (listing powers of city
manager, including power to “[d]irect and supervise the administration of all departments, offices and
agencies of the city,” and noting that “the manager will not only perform managerial duties in the city’s
operations but will also have a significant role in the development of policy”).
295. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40 (2018) (“Powers and Duties of Cities and Towns”).
296. Cf. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally
has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”).
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held to fall outside a local government’s home rule powers.297 As a result,
local legislatures govern as much by communication as through
legislation with the force of law. For example, the New York City Council
does not enact ordinances to micromanage the lane-by-lane design of the
more than 6000 miles of streets in the city;298 this would be impractical
and nearly impossible. But the political buy-in of council members is
necessary for the Department of Transportation to engage in a project as
small as changing a single street from two lanes to one over ten blocks.299
In this context and the many others like it, council members do not
legislate; they instruct.
This communication-based role of the legislature would be far less
effective in a bicameral system, where the legislature could not speak
with one voice. A hearing in one chamber cannot pass messages to the
bureaucracy as reliably if the other chamber might disagree; a legislator
cannot credibly claim to speak for her district if her colleague from the
other chamber voices a contrary opinion. In the face of legislative
dissensus, agencies would continue to act, simply without effective
legislative oversight.
Of course, members of Congress intercede with administrative
agencies as well, through formal hearings and informal communications,
bicameralism notwithstanding.300 But the context is different. At the
federal level, Congressional intervention most commonly follows the
“representative-as-ombudsman” model, in which the legislator simply
connects constituents to agencies and helps them navigate the
bureaucracy, usually to secure access to public benefits.301 When it comes
to substantive interventions in the discretionary decisions of an agency,
courts look askance at legislative meddling and protect agencies from
Congressional intrusions.302 Federal agencies are also more constrained
by
laws
and
procedures:
they
are
generally

297. See generally Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113 (2007) (describing
state preemption of local legislation).
298. Strategic Plan 2016: 1. Introduction, NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF TRANSP. (2016),
http://www.nycdotplan.nyc/introduction (2016).
299. See Brad Aaron & Stephen Miller, Tonight: Tell Manhattan CBs That Harlem Needs a Safer
Morningside Avenue, STREETSBLOG NYC (Oct. 23, 2013), http://nyc.streetsblog.org/2013/10/23/
tonight-tell-manhattan-cbs-that-harlem-needs-a-safer-morningside-avenue/.
300. See Edward J. Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, and
Partner, 1990 DUKE L.J. 967, 971 (1990).
301. See Joshua Bone, Stop Ignoring Pork and Potholes: Election Law and Constituent Service,
123 YALE L.J. 1406, 1412–14 (2014); see also Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1099, 1135–36 (2005) (observing that constituent services play a particularly important role
in local government, compared to Congress).
302. Jamelle C. Sharpe, Judging Congressional Oversight, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 183, 185, 197–202
(2013) (“[C]ourts have decided that federal legislators cannot control or heavily influence how agency
officials exercise the powers delegated to them.”); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2255–60 (2001) (describing relationship between Congress and agencies).
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rulemakers and adjudicators, not street-level implementers.303 Local
government both allows for, and requires, more direct dialogue between
the legislature and the bureaucracy; unicameralism allows that dialogue
to be clear and direct.
It is not just theoretical that local unicameralism is meant to elevate
the legislature in order to check the executive. The framers of the 1989
New York City Charter, which finally planted unicameralism firmly into
the city’s structure, explicitly understood unicameralism to promote
checks and balances at the local level. They described their restructuring
of the legislative branch to consist of a single chamber as a decision “to
empower . . . the Council . . . .”304 Their stated purpose was for the
“legislature to balance and check the executive branch.”305 Moreover,
they even connected the value of unicameralism to the executive-focused
nature of local government.306 Bronx Borough President Fernando
Ferrer, for example, sharply distinguished between bicameral states and
the unicameral structure he favored for the city, arguing that cities “fill
potholes” and provide direct service delivery.307 In New York City,
unicameralism was an attempt to elevate the status of the legislature
against the already-empowered executive.
Indeed, this motivation for unicameralism can even be seen in that
bastion of bicameralism: the United States Congress. Where the federal
government most resembles local government’s executive-focused,
highly discretionary structure¾in foreign affairs¾Congress has
attempted to make itself more unicameral, to better check the executive.
For example, the President has broad control over the military and, given
the exigencies of military action, Congress cannot usually manage
military operations through its normal lawmaking process.308 Thus,
when Congress perceived that the President had abused that control, it
passed the War Powers Resolution, which, among other things, requires
the President to remove American troops from hostilities unless
Congress specifically authorizes an operation within sixty days.309
Effectively, this creates a one-house veto, as either chamber can, on its
303. Cf. Davidson, supra note 14, at 591–92 (“As increasingly significant as local regulation may
be, the provision of public services has historically been central to local-government identity, more so
than at other levels of government.”).
304. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 776.
305. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 777.
306. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 777 (“Much of the focus of a city government is on the
delivery of services . . . .”).
307. Purdum, supra note 150.
308. Cf. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb¾Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 691, 751
(2008) (debating whether Congress may Constitutionally intervene in tactical and operational
discussions and describing and acknowledging that many such Congressional interventions would be
“absurd”).
309. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2011).
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own, force an end to the conflict.310 Congress knew that retaining the
fullest protections of bicameralism would simply empower the executive
to proceed as it wishes¾just as police forces and school principals would
be able to do if local governments were bicameral. A move toward
unicameralism promoted checks-and-balances. Likewise, in the
intelligence arena, Congress created a special bipartisan, bicameral body,
nicknamed the “Gang of Eight,” which the executive must inform of all
covert
actions.311
In
other
words,
it
created
a
quasi-unicameral entity. When the legislature is placed in an essentially
reactive position, it must act with unity to check the executive.
Institutional design in federal foreign policy evidences the same
principle as in local government design: where the executive is always
and necessarily active, the legislature is best structured in a streamlined
manner. In local government, the executive branch is dominant and the
default condition is executive action. Roadblocks to legislative action,
such as bicameralism, only strengthen the executive’s hand further.
Unicameralism empowers the legislature to act efficiently, but in a way
that often promotes checks and balances.
D. LACK OF SENTIMENT IN LOCAL LEGISLATURES
The executive nature of local government provides another
explanation for local unicameralism as well. Local legislatures¾if not
local governments¾may be sites for sentiment and cultural meaning to
a lesser degree than state and federal governments. The arguments for
unicameralism are fundamentally instrumental, whereas important
arguments for bicameralism are symbolic. Symbolism, it turns out, plays
a small role in how local legislatures are constituted.
The debates over unicameralism at the state and local levels, as
already noted, involved largely the same arguments on each side.
However, those arguments had different force in each setting.
Unicameralism’s supporters emphasized efficiency, seeing bicameralism
as a source of gridlock due to the effective supermajority requirement it
imposes.312 They even pointed to the truly mundane issue of direct cost
savings: One set of legislators requires fewer salaries and health
insurance plans than two.313 The defenders of bicameralism, in contrast,
did not only discuss the procedural consequences of a second chamber.

310. Whether this survives I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) is to some extent an open
question, Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Clinton Administration and War Powers, 63 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 125, 129 n.25 (2000), but not one relevant here. As a matter of institutional design,
single-chamber action was deemed necessary to constrain executive power in this area.
311. See Kathleen Clark, “A New Era of Openness?”: Disclosing Intelligence to Congress Under
Obama, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 313, 318 (2010).
312. See supra Part I.A.
313. See, e.g., supra notes 92, 117.
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They described bicameralism as rooted in tradition and elevated by the
blessing of the Framers of the national Constitution.314
Cultural, symbolic arguments for bicameralism were available for
local government. Most large cities began as bicameral, as Part I.A shows.
Cities could have sought to maintain a connection to that past by
maintaining their upper legislative chambers, but did not do so.315 They
could have continued to cultivate comparisons to the federal
government, as Baltimore tried to do in its early experiment with a local
electoral college.316 Indeed, local governments have roughly as strong a
historical claim to an early bicameral tradition as do the states: After all,
three states adopted unicameral legislatures during the Revolutionary
and Founding eras.317
Moreover, these traditionalist arguments were made in the debates
over local unicameralism; they simply did not take. In Arizona and
Alaska, the historical record shows appeals to the traditional
two-chambered legislative structure and comparisons to Congress to
have been effective, even determinative, arguments.318 For states, it was
demeaning or unserious to adopt unicameralism. In Atlanta, though,
when the same appeals were marshaled, they did not define the public
discourse. A rhetoric of modernization dominated in Atlanta (and
Philadelphia, and in the newspaper coverage of unicameralism debates
across the country), not a rhetoric of traditionalism. Local legislatures
were meant to get things done, not serve as repositories for public
meaning.319
In some sense, Everett¾that singular holdout for so long¾is the
exception that proves the rule. Bicameralism lasted so long in Everett
because bicameralism took on special cultural significance as a local
tradition, a “badge of pride.”320 Indeed, for many years, Everett held
summertime picnics and softball games with Waterville, Maine, the
314. See supra Part I.A.
315. This could be done even with a vestigial upper chamber, akin to the contemporary House of
Lords. See Stephen Gardbaum, Separation of Powers and the Growth of Judicial Review in
Established Democracies (or Why Has the Model of Legislative Supremacy Mostly Been Withdrawn
from Sale?), 62 AM. J. COMPARATIVE L. 613, 636 (2014) (describing vestigial upper chambers in the
United Kingdom, Belgium and Canada).
316. Supra notes 67-70.
317. Supra notes 170-72.
318. Supra notes 188–92, 200–02 and accompanying text.
319. Perhaps nothing illustrates the contrast with state legislatures better¾or at least more
colorfully¾than Massachusetts’ Sacred Cod. A symbol of the state legislature since the 18th century,
this carved wooden fish is treated with such veneration that when the legislature moved to a new State
House, representatives carried it wrapped in an American flag. When it was briefly “codnapped,” the
loss was deemed important enough to dredge the Charles River. Maria Abate, History of the Sacred
Cod, EEEF2008: ECOLOGICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY ETHOLOGY OF FISHES, BOSTON U. (2008),
https://www.bu.edu/eeef/sacredcodhistory.html. This sort of ritualism is generally absent at the local
level.
320. Rosenberg, supra note 7.
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second-to-last city to abandon bicameralism.321 Everett was not more or
less powerful than any other Massachusetts municipality, subject to
different pulls from interlocal competition or state control, or uniquely
heterogeneous. But its bicameral legislature had a unique significance for
the town, just as bicameralism has a singular place in the popular
understanding of the federal constitution. In the rare case where a local
legislature became a site for tradition and civic self-understanding,
bicameralism showed much more staying power.
The emptiness of local legislature as cultural objects mirrors the
formal constitutional status of local governments. Doctrinally, local
governments are mere administrative appendages of the state,
constitutionally no different than administrative agencies.322 From this
perspective, local governments are merely a helpful mechanism for
states, the true holders of sovereignty, to achieve their ends, and they can
be created, destroyed, or reorganized as needed by state governments.323
If the very identity or existence of a local government has no permanence,
why should the structure of its legislature? Rather, the design of local
governments is like the design of agencies: functionalist. Agencies are
structured by Congressional drafters who seek to advance particular
bureaucratic goals through institutional design.324 The internal
organization of an agency, however, is of essentially no symbolic salience
to the general public.325 Likewise, the choice of local legislative structure
has historically turned on instrumental rather than cultural calculations.
States, which jealously guard their status as “dual sovereigns” from
encroachment,326 mirror federal institutions to visibly and symbolically
demonstrate their equality with the national government. Local
governments, which lack that formal sovereignty, need not strive for that
stature.

321. Rosenberg, supra note 7.
322. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
323. Id. But see Briffault, supra note 218 (discussing implicit constitutional protections for local
government); Kazis, supra note 246 (arguing that local governments retain the fundamental quality
of sovereignty: a monopoly on the legitimate use of force).
324. See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013) (analyzing structural features of federal
administrative agencies).
325. For example, one think tank article on how to effectively reorganize the executive branch
details the potential opposition to reorganization from within the bureaucracy and on Capitol Hill from
those guarding their turf and discusses how to manage interest groups and stakeholders. It does not
identify public opinion or messaging as relevant to the reorganization process. Harrison Wellford et
al., Executive Reorganization: Six Lessons from the 1970s, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (June 9, 2011),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/general/report/2011/06/09/9732/executive-reorg
anization/.
326. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
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Although local legislatures are designed instrumentally, one should
not overstate the instrumentalism of local government writ large.327
People identify with their cities and towns. Moreover, they identify with
the governmental institutions of their cities and towns, not only the
geographic communities those governments happen to cover. Mayors
can “generate collective feelings of ownership and belonging and can
articulate a city’s civic identity,” as Richard Schragger has argued. 328
Even certain local bureaucracies are sites of public sentiment. Cities
rename street corners for slain police officers,329 and professional sports
teams hold moments of silence for firefighters killed in the line of duty.330
Like soldiers for the nation, public safety workers stand in for the local
body politic. But local legislatures are not the sites for this sort of civic
religion: for the reasons identified in the previous section, the executive
is. Consequently, neither tradition nor the federal analogy pushes local
governments toward bicameralism with much force.
Local unicameralism does not reflect only the dynamics of cost and
benefit. It is the product of more than a weighing of the risks and rewards
of majoritarianism in a particular context of local power and
powerlessness. As the city of Everett¾or the state of
Alaska¾demonstrates, cultural forces can overwhelm cool-eyed
calculations of institutional design. But at the local level, there is little
cultural pressure to retain the federally inspired seemliness of
bicameralism or even simply to keep traditional institutions in place.
Befitting their constitutional status as mere instrumentalities of the state,
local legislatures can be designed and redesigned for instrumental ends.
E. CONVERGENCE IN THE FACE OF LOCAL DIFFERENCE
This Part has offered four explanations for why local governments,
but not states, have embraced the efficiency and majoritarianism of
unicameralism. All apply to “local governments” in the abstract, but local
327. Aaron Saiger’s provocative and illuminating comparison of local governments and state
administrative agencies falls into this trap, underestimating how much citizens understand their local
governments to be meaningfully independent, and not actually administrative agencies. Saiger, supra
note 287. His proposal for importing notice-and-comment procedures, including additional voice for
those outside jurisdictional boundaries, into local lawmaking would, I think, meet widespread
resistance from residents who see themselves as citizens, not stakeholders. Saiger, supra note 287, at
448–49. As one example, participants in local administrative procedures routinely emphasize not only
that they are local residents but also how long they have lived there¾citizenship is highly valued in
this setting.
328. Schragger, supra note 17, at 2573.
329. See, e.g., Graham Rayman & Nathan Place, South Bronx Street Renamed After Kevin Gillespie,
NYPD Officer Killed in 1996 Carjacking, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/
new-york/south-bronx-street-renamed-killed-carjacking-article-1.2561733.
330. See, e.g., Tod Palmer, Royals, KCFD Hold Moment of Silence Before ALDS Game 5, KANSAS
CITY STAR (Oct. 14, 2015, 2:12 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/sports/spt-columns-blogs/k-zone/
article39156336.html.
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governments are not abstract. They are diverse in size, shape, and
function and usually have the institutional differences to match. Why,
then, have they all adopted unicameralism in lockstep?
Given the vast differences between individual cities, towns, counties
and special districts, the weight of each of these four explanations for
local unicameralism will vary across jurisdictions and across decades.
Tiebout competition acts more forcefully on some places and during
some eras, depending on the costs of moving.331 Some cities are diverse
metropoles, not small homogenous communities.332 A “contract city”
that outsources all its services, keeping in-house only taxation and landuse decisions, will be less executive-dominated than one that provides for
itself.333 Each government has its own path to unicameralism.
Even so, while the relative force of each explanation advanced here
varies jurisdiction by jurisdiction, the direction in which each points does
not. Each consistently distinguishes local government from the states: It
is near-definitional that a city or town will be more constrained than the
state it is a part of, for example, or that the policy preferences of its
residents will vary less. Thus, some combination of these features of local
government always presses down on one side of the scales between
efficiency and checks and balances, or between modernization and
tradition. In Atlanta, bicameralism might suddenly appear clunky
because the city needs to forcefully respond to competition from new
suburbs; but in those same suburbs, it might be residents’ unity of
interests that most shapes perception of legislative design. In New York
City, it might be the enormous power wielded by the mayor and the
executive branch, given the scope of services the city provides. Local
governments differ from each other, but their shared features, taken
together in varying blends, always push toward unicameralism.
Given the more than 90,000 local governments, though, it still
remains remarkable that not one retains a bicameral structure.334
Somehow, all heterogeneity was excised. Most likely, two other features
of local government explain the final mopping up of any difference. First,
as Susan Rose-Ackerman famously observed, local government leaders
331. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 228, at 1535 (“[A]gglomeration is interfering with Tiebout
sorting; the existence of agglomeration gains reduces the degree to which people sort between local
governments on the basis of their policy preferences.”); Jan K. Brueckner & David Neumark, Beaches,
Sunshine, and Public Sector Pay: Theory and Evidence on Amenities and Rent Extraction by
Government Workers, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 198, 227 (2014).
332. It is likely no coincidence that New York City¾which is diverse, has the economic strength to
resist some interlocal competition and the political strength to resist some state incursions on its
power¾retained its variant on bicameralism until the end of the 20th century.
333. See GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION (1981).
334. Of course, this is in some ways an accident of timing. Had this Article been published a few
years earlier, there would have been one: Everett. In analyzing the uniformity of local legislative
design, there is little meaningful difference between zero and a handful of outliers: Until it joined the
pack, Everett was merely the exception that proved the rule.
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have strong incentives to avoid risky innovation.335 Moreover, for this
kind of structural innovation, the countervailing forces supporting local
policy innovation¾such as ideology, political parties and interest
groups¾do not exist in today’s political culture.336 Put simply, by the end
of the 20th century, the founders of a new municipality or special service
district incorporating on the edge of a fast-growing city would have every
incentive to follow their neighbors and stick to unicameralism, without
investing their efforts and political capital in the (local) oddity of
bicameralism.
Second, local government budgets are small and tight: the minor
direct fiscal savings of unicameralism are enough to matter and enough
to tilt the balance for a wavering government.337 A local budget can
always be measured in salaries, and a legislator’s pay can be directly
weighed against another teacher in the classrooms. For a city still flirting
with bicameralism, “everyone else is doing it” and “we could hire a few
more cops” could be determinative arguments: not enough to explain the
overwhelming push towards unicameralism in the first place, but
sufficient to herd in any outliers. Copycat behavior and the ever-present
need to trim the budget consolidated the convergence of local
governments on a single legislative design. They brought us to the
constitutional condition of today, where unicameralism has swept the
field.
III. THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN A UNICAMERAL WORLD
So far, this Article has attempted to explain why local government
has become uniformly unicameral. It offered both a historical account of
the path taken to unicameralism and a more theoretical exploration of
why local government might be better suited to unicameralism. But at
this point, local unicameralism is a fact about American government, and
a settled one at that. Looking forward, local unicameralism can be taken
as a given¾although existing scholarship has not done so. In this Part, I
show how acknowledging local unicameralism has important
implications for three long-running scholarly debates. Within local
335. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk-Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?,
9 J. LEG. STUD. 593, 594 (1980).
336. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1379–97 (2009) (summarizing literature
responding to Rose-Ackerman thesis on local risk aversion). Notably, this is not always true: In the
Progressive Era, local institutional design had powerful ideological and institutional backers and could
provide local innovators with substantial reputational benefits.
337. In Everett, for example, the now-unicameral city council’s personnel costs total $342,538 in
the most recent budget, out of $56.5 million in total city department spending, excluding schools. CITY
OF EVERETT, FY 18 ANNUAL BUDGET
(2017), http://cityofeverett.com/DocumentCenter/
View/2608. At more than half a percent, legislative personnel makes up a meaningful line item in tight
times, even if not the driver of the city budget.
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government law, the fact of local unicameralism helps recast the conflict
between localists and regionalists, and in particular arguments over the
importance of political participation in local government. It suggests that
local government is structured to promote participation in
administrative, not legislative, processes, and that participationist
defenses of localism must adjust accordingly.
But the divide between local and state or federal legislative design
has implications far outside local government law as well. Statutory
interpretation methodologies and theories of judicial review, too, must
make room for local difference. This Article only scratches the surface.
Its goal is to carve out space for a specifically local jurisprudence, distinct
from the doctrines developed for the federal government. But to begin
that effort, it shows how courts should be more willing to use legislative
history when interpreting local ordinances and argues that the hypermajoritarianism of local governments requires a recalibration of judicial
review to be more supportive of policy experimentation but also more
vigilant against failures of the democratic process.
A. LOCALISM, PARTICIPATION, AND UNICAMERALISM
Among scholars of local government law, perhaps no debate is more
fundamental than that between localists and regionalists.338 Generally
speaking, the localists seek to devolve power downwards¾even to the
neighborhood level¾while regionalists would push governance upward
and away from municipalities.339 These camps have additional internal
taxonomies. One set of localists sees towns, cities, and even
neighborhoods as sites for communitarian values: civic engagement and
active democratic participation.340 The regionalists, instead, see
smallness as fostering parochialism and exclusion, not positive
338. See Briffault, supra note 230, at 392–93 (describing and challenging dominance among
scholars of “general proposition that local autonomy should be protected and enhanced”); David
Schleicher, Local Government Law’s “Law and ___” Problem, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1951, 1963
(2013) (expressing disappointment in local government literature for failure to move past
localism/regionalism debate).
339. See Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV . 1, 1–2 (2000) (describing
localism, regionalism, and their relationship).
340. See discussion infra notes 345-353. Other localists, focused on Tiebout competition and
citizen oversight, see smaller levels of government as fostering competition and thereby efficiency. See,
e.g., Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency
Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988) (describing perspective that “views
interjurisdictional competition as a beneficent force that, similar to its role in the private sector,
compels public agents to make efficient decisions”); Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and
Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 190, 200 (2001) (noting that “competition among
localities . . . is credited with controlling bureaucratic budgets and facilitating monitoring of local
officials[,]” and collecting sources); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of
Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 73, 85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997)
(“[T]he current empirical evidence suggests competitive local governments can provide an efficient
level of congestible (local) public goods.”).
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democratic values, or at least perceive participation not to be worth the
high costs of balkanization and inefficient administration.341 The fact of
local unicameralism¾and more importantly, its history¾sheds new
light on this aspect of the localism debate.
By selecting unicameralism, local governments have already opted
against maximum participation in structuring the legislative process. At
least within the legislative branch, local government embodies the virtues
of efficiency and rough majoritarianism, not participation and
consensus. Grappling with local unicameralism reveals the participatory
localists to be, as Rick Hills has argued, romantics.342 Deliberative
democracy may be a noble vision for local government, but it is not
always the choice of local governments themselves. If participatory
democracy is to be the basis for a new localist devolution of power, its
supporters must understand where that participation occurs in local
government¾and where it does not.343
A robust literature exists defending local governments as sites for
fostering participation and forming community.344 This tradition traces
itself back to Thomas Jefferson’s embrace of the New England town
meeting as “little republics,”345 Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill’s
perception that local government teaches the skills of citizenship,346 and
to Hannah Arendt’s promotion of “public freedom” through civic
participation.347 More recently, Jerry Frug, for example, has written
extensively about the “values of decentralization¾the freedom gained
from the ability to participate in the basic societal decisions that affect
341. See, e.g., DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (2d ed. 1993); MYRON ORFIELD,
METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY (1997); Briffault, supra note 339,
at 7–14; Cashin, infra note 344, at 1990.
342. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic Defense of
City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (2000) (reviewing GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING
COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999)).
343. This is a practical argument. I take no stand on the appropriate role for participation in local
government; the historical choice to minimize participatory values in designing local legislatures does
not justify that outcome. Nor do I suggest that participatory localists must make their peace with the
form of local legislatures that do not embody their values. But if those localists hope to actually
increase participation in local government, they must respond to the structural forces arrayed against
them in the legislative sphere.
344. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1998 (2000) (“The sine qua non of
localism is the idea that small government best facilitates political participation and civic engagement
by the public.”); cf. Joseph P. Viteritti & Gerald J. Russello, Community and American Federalism:
Images Romantic and Real, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 683 (1997) (describing history of “romantic image”
of local community in American politics).
345. See Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1382 (2014) (quoting Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Governor John Tyler (May 26, 1810), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
391, 393–94 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907)).
346. Cf. Hills, supra note 342, at 2028.
347. Shoked, supra note 345, at 1382 (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 114–15, 119–20
(1963)).
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one’s life, the creativity generated by the capacity to experiment in
solving public problems and to tailor possible solutions to local needs,
and the energy derived from democratic forms of organization.”348 While
cognizant of the ways that current local government law supports
inequality, Frug dismisses larger governments as unable to “engender the
kind of democratic participation in public affairs that is possible on a
local basis.”349
In a similar vein, Georgette Poindexter has celebrated smaller
governments as allowing a citizen to “have a meaningful voice in
participatory democracy” and thereby to “count herself as a consensual
member of the community.”350 She has described the neighborhood as
the “optimal level for city government” because it best “fosters
community at the local level by increasing participation in
democracy . . . .”351 For Frug, Poindexter, and others in this civic
republican tradition,352 hands-on participation and face-to-face
deliberation, possible only at a small scale, promote true democracy.353
Their support for localism rests, in part, on their belief that local
government in fact embodies participatory and consensual norms.
Local government truly is, in certain ways, more participatory and
communitarian than state and federal government. Empirical evidence
suggests that in smaller jurisdictions, citizens are more likely to contact
their elected officials or attend public meetings (although voting rates are
lower).354 Additionally, the sheer number of local government
officials¾around three percent of adult Americans have served in local
government in some capacity¾makes local government much more
accessible.355 But of all the reasons that local government are
participatory, local legislatures are not one of them.
By choosing unicameralism, local governments have opted against
deliberation, participation, and consensus in the legislative process. Most
obviously, bicameralism doubles a citizen’s opportunities for direct

348. Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 257 (1993).
349. Id. at 271.
350. Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City,
145 U. PA. L. R EV. 607, 616 (1997).
351. Id. at 649.
352. See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1908 (1994) (“Participatory politics cannot thrive in a mass
democracy. If anything, local units need to become smaller to make meaningful political participation
feasible.”); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389–94 (1997); see also Carol
M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on
“Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U. L. R EV. 74, 96–97 (1989) (providing a more eclectic
vision of local government informed by participatory and republican values).
353. Cashin, supra note 344, at 2001–02.
354. See, e.g., J. ERIC OLIVER, DEMOCRACY IN SUBURBIA 42–52 (2001).
355. Hills, supra note 342, at 2027 (citing SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E.
BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 51 (1995)).
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engagement with their representatives. Instead of one city councilman,
she might have a councilman and an alderman. Bicameralism also offers
double the hearings, for those who prioritize more public and structured
forms of participation. It offers two leadership structures, doubling the
chances for ordinary citizens to test the waters of local politics and then
rise to positions of power.356 As the president of Everett’s Board of
Aldermen argued in opposing his city’s turn to unicameralism, a second
chamber is “an inexpensive way for people to have access to government
officials.”357 What’s more, switches from bicameralism to unicameralism
were frequently paired with reductions in the overall size of the local
legislature.358 Unicameralism was meant to streamline local legislatures,
even at the expense of access.359
Unicameralism makes legislatures less republican in other, subtler
ways as well. Bicameralism, famously, functions as a supermajority
requirement.360
This
prioritizes
consensus building,
since
near-consensus can be required to secure the approval of both houses
simultaneously.361 Bicameralism also encourages deliberation: Not only
must two chambers simultaneously agree on a policy, they must then
compromise between themselves as to each detail in another round of
negotiation.362 The Framers understood bicameralism to promote
deliberation and consensus.363 In choosing unicameralism, the framers
of local government law instead opted for the power of a simple majority
to act expeditiously.
And unlike even a supermajoritarian unicameral legislature,
bicameral legislatures can be split along partisan lines. Parties are
essential mediating entities for political participation, so partisan control
356. Cf. Independent Staff, supra note 124 (quoting critic of unicameralism in Everett as arguing
that “it’s going to eliminate a lot of people that are trying to get into the process. Most of our mayors
at some point had come from the city council or started out on a board and worked their way up.”).
357. Rosenberg, supra note 7.
358. See, e.g., Contosta, supra note 82 and accompanying text.
359. Arguably, unicameralism improves access. If your legislator listens to you, he can more easily
translate your input into policy and if he does not, you can more easily hold him accountable. But this
is still less access, and a shift from a more republican to a more liberal model of representation.
360. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 242 (1962).
361. See John F. Manning, The Role of the Philadelphia Convention in Constitutional
Adjudication, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1753, 1781–82 (2012) (noting that bicameralism requires
“unusual consensus” and “compromise”).
362. Cf. Rogers, supra note 187, at 108–09 (describing relationship of conference committees and
unicameralism).
363. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1562; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 443 (Alexander
Hamilton):
The oftener the measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the
situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which
flow from want of due deliberation or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion
of some common passion or interest.
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of a branch of government critically enhances opportunities for effective
civic engagement.364 In a divided legislature, there is no minority party
shut out of governance;365 all citizens and all interest groups have a
chance to make their voices heard. Unicameral local governments cannot
offer that protection to their political minorities. Its proponents saw
divided government as gridlock to be avoided.
As might be expected, given their majoritarian unicameralist design,
local legislatures are not generally heralded as sites of democratic values
or popular participation. City councils in municipalities large and small
are routinely described as operating behind closed doors or in smokefilled rooms.366 Often, leadership is top-down with presidents and
speakers exercising total control over the legislative agenda.367 This can
be characterized positively or negatively, but it cannot be described as
deliberative, participatory democracy.
Rather, participation in local government is concentrated in the
administrative process. Neighbors pack zoning hearings, anxiously
concerned about changes to their block (and perhaps their property
values).368 Parents attend parent-teacher conferences multiple times per
year and organize parent-teacher associations to participate further in
school governance.369 Under Chicago’s community policing model, each
of the city’s 279 police beats holds a monthly meeting for residents to
364. See Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over: McCutcheon, Shadow Parties,
and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. R EV. 175, 206–07 (2014) (describing “competition
and cajoling, the disagreeing and the deliberating, the buttonholing and bickering that takes
place¾and should continue to take place¾within the party itself”).
365. See Schleicher, supra note 19.
366. See, e.g., McCrea v. Flaherty, 885 N.E.2d 836, 838 (Mass. Ct. App. 2008) (“The city council
of Boston . . . finds itself, not for the first time, on the losing end of a determination that it has
improperly excluded the public from its deliberations.”); Jeff McMenemy, Splaine Ready to Go to
Court over City Council’s “Non-Meetings,” PORTSMOUTH HERALD (Nov. 25, 2016, 2:27 PM),
http://www.seacoastonline.com/news/20161125/splaine-ready-to-go-to-court-over-city-councilsnon-meetings (describing legal battles between Portsmouth, New Hampshire city council and
assistant mayor over closed sessions); Scott Franz, Steamboat Springs City Council Doing More
Business Behind Closed Doors, STEAMBOAT TODAY (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.steamboattoday
.com/news/steamboat-springs-city-council-doing-more-business-behind-closed-doors (City Council
of Steamboat Springs, Colorado met in closed sessions forty-two percent of time, after members
campaigned on pro-transparency platform).
367. See, e.g., Harold Jackson, Opinion, Clarke the Most Powerful Person in City Hall, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Oct. 29, 2014, 10:35 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/under-the-sun/
Clarke-the-most-powerful-person-in-City-Hall.html (“Rarely does any other Council member utter a
peep in opposition to their president’s desires.”).
368. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45, 83–85
(1994) (describing “Zoning as A Participatory Democracy”); WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS 9 (2009) (describing otherwise-sane neighbors suddenly behaving as “crazy” NIMBYs at
zoning board hearing).
369. CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN SCHOOLS 3 (2013), http://www.child
trends.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/39_Parent_Involvement_In_Schools.pdf (collecting data
showing that seventy-six percent of students’ parents attended a meeting with teachers and forty-two
percent volunteered with the school).
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work with officers; an average of twenty-six residents attend each
meeting.370 These executive branch encounters¾which needless to say,
look very different than a HUD or Education Department rulemaking at
the federal level¾are where local government gains its participatory
edge.
Noticing local unicameralism helps clarify where in local
government participation occurs. In turn, that can help shape proposals
for reform. For example, Gerald Frug has famously and repeatedly called
for the creation of new “regional legislature[s].”371 These legislatures
would lack an attached regional government; administration would still
occur through existing municipalities.372 Importantly, Frug’s goal is
dialogic, he intends the regional legislature not simply to preempt local
powers by a more regionally minded entity¾state governments can
already do that,373 and in any case Frug is no regionalist¾but to serve as
a “forum for inter-local negotiations about how to decentralize power.”374
Frug hopes to “transform[] the subjectivity of the region’s localities” and
help them “reach[] for the perspectives of other and different persons.”375
But an examination of local unicameralism reveals that Frug looks
in exactly the wrong place for his goal.376 At the local level, legislatures
are not sites for dialogue, negotiation, consensus-building, or identity
formation. They are designed to enact policy preferences with a
minimum of fuss. Nor is there even a glimmer of popular desire to return
local legislatures to a bicameral design. Thus, Frug attempts to increase
local participation in precisely the manner that faces the fiercest
headwinds: he seeks dialogue in the branch where historical and
structural features of local government have relentlessly stripped out
dialogue and replaced it with arch majoritarianism and flat
instrumentalism. To achieve Frug’s goal of restructuring local
government law to “build unity out of differences,”377 it might be better
to look to the real sites of democratic action at the local level: the
executive branch. For example, consolidated school districts, magnet

370. WESLEY G. SKOGAN, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT:
COMMUNITY
POLICING
IN
CHICAGO
3
(2000),
http://www.skogan.org/files/Public
_Involvement-Community_Policing_in_Chicago.NIJ_Summary.pdf.
371. Frug, supra note 348, at 294–300; see also Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002) (one of many elaborations of the idea).
372. Frug, supra note 349, at 294–97.
373. See, e.g., Jason Moreira, Regionalism, Federalism, and the Paradox of Local Democracy:
Reclaiming State Power in Pursuit of Regional Equity, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 501, 536–42 (2015).
374. Frug, supra note 349, at 297.
375. Frug, supra note 349, at 295, 299 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493, 1528 (1988).
376. Frug’s proposal is subject to a great many other persuasive criticisms. See, e.g., Hills, supra
note 343; Been, supra note 231, at 1112–14.
377. Frug, supra note 349, at 300.
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schools, or interdistrict busing schemes might all be better placed to
promote this pluralistic vision that a regional legislature would be.378
Conversely, Rick Hills has put out a call for “specific regional
arrangements,” grounded in empirical reality, that “minimally affect
citizens’ capacity and willingness to show up at hearings, educate
themselves in the workings of democratic systems, and learn the arts of
democratic governance.”379 This Article provides one data point to aid the
search for such arrangements. I have shown that citizens themselves
place a low value on local legislatures as fora for democratic
participation, even as they eagerly crowd meeting rooms to engage with
local bureaucracies. It may be that maximizing regionalism’s equities and
efficiencies alongside localism’s participation requires shifting
policymaking to higher levels of government while devolving
administration down.380
Acknowledging local unicameralism will not (and should not!) turn
localists into regionalists, or vice versa. It is just one fact about local
governments¾albeit an important one¾and here I have sketched its
relevance to just one aspect of the localism debate. But the localism
debate has been blinkered by its failure to consider the structural aspects
of local government. The localists and the regionalists alike have treated
local governments as smaller and more subordinate than states or
regional governments, but not as differently designed.
Take education, for example. It is not enough to ask whether
education policy and finance should be decentralized or centralized. In
one region, decentralization might inevitably mean decisionmaking not
just by locals, but by independently elected school districts, operating
without separation of powers and, yes, organized unicamerally.
Centralization would bring with it the entire state constitutional
structure: perhaps a bicameral legislature and an education department
separately controlled by the governor. The intergovernmental aspects of
local government law do not exist independently of its

378. Cf. Erika K. Wilson, Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public
Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1465–66 (2014) (describing existing “regionalist-like interdistrict
desegregation programs”).
379. Hills, supra note 342, at 2034.
380. Or maybe not. Administration is already largely localized¾frontline bureaucrats like teachers
and firefighters are generally local employees. So this “proposal” may simply reflect the accumulated
wisdom of the status quo. Moreover, the politics/administration dichotomy is dead and buried. See
Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Courts, a Protected Bureaucracy, and Reinventing
Government, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 818 n.180 (1995). If zoning decisions, for example, are made
through a series of site-specific exceptions rather than a predetermined zoning map or comprehensive
plan, (see Noah M. Kazis, Public Actors, Private Law: Local Governments’ Use of Covenants to
Regulate Land Use, 124 YALE L.J. 1790, 1802–03 (2015)), is it possible for land use policy be set forth
regionally without abandoning local administration? As Hills himself said, any balancing of localism
and regionalism will be “always tentative.” Hills, supra note 343, at 2034.
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intra-governmental, structural dimensions. This Article aims to help
bring structure back into the analysis for localists and regionalists alike.
B. INTERPRETING STATUTES FROM UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURES
Local unicameralism also has implications outside local government
law, at least as the field is narrowly defined. Statutory interpretation is
one of the central functions of the judiciary381 and a subject of extensive
scholarly and judicial debate. However, as those debates rage on and as
interpretive methodologies are refined, there is an unspoken assumption
that the statutes being interpreted were enacted by Congress or by state
legislatures with a very similar structure.382 Prominent theories of
interpretation, spanning the ideological spectrum, rely on the premise
that legislation is passed bicamerally. At the local level, where all
legislatures are unicameral, those theories do not apply. A new
appreciation of local unicameralism (and local legislative difference more
generally) will require the development of new interpretive theories, and
the adaptation of old ones, for the local context. As an example, this Part
discusses the use of legislative history at the local level, suggesting that,
all things being equal, courts should be more willing to look to legislative
history in a unicameral context than when reviewing state or federal
legislation.
Courts have long used legislative history to guide the interpretation
of ambiguous statutory provisions,383 but the use of legislative history has
become controversial. Beginning in the 1980s, the New Textualists, led
by Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook, generated a
comprehensive critique of purposive methods of statutory interpretation,
including reliance on legislative history.384 While this critique drew force
from numerous sources, one strand of the New Textualism held that the
use of legislative history was unconstitutional: unlike legislative text,
legislative history was not enacted by both houses of Congress and
presented to the President for a signature. Whatever the merits of this
argument, it plainly does not apply to local governments. Neither the text
of Article I nor its spirit applies to local legislation.
The constitutional attack on the use of legislative history is rooted in
Article I, Section 7 of the federal Constitution.385 That section lays out the
381. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1275 (2001)
(“The twentieth century inaugurated an age of statutes or, as we prefer, an era of super-statutes.”).
382. In short remarks given at N.Y.U., Richard Briffault challenged this assumption, listing a
plethora of differences between the national legislative process and those at the state and local levels,
including stronger legislative leaders, shorter sessions and part-time legislators, line-item vetoes, and
a lack of separation of powers. Briffault, supra note 22, at 24–29.
383. See Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1892).
384. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1288–92 (2010).
385. Victoria F. Nourse, The Constitution and Legislative History, 17 U. PA. J. C ONST. L. 313, 324–
25 (2014).
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requirements for the enactment of a statute, including passage in both
the House of Representatives and the Senate (bicameralism) and the
assent of the President (presentment).386 Since committee reports, floor
statements and other forms of legislative history are not voted on by even
one full chamber, much less by both, it is argued that they violate the
bicameralism and presentment requirements.387 As Justice Scalia wrote,
“[a]n enactment by implication cannot realistically be regarded as the
product of the difficult lawmaking process our Constitution has
prescribed. Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies
between Congressmen . . . are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon
the text of a law and its presentment to the President.”388
While the unconstitutionality of using legislative history is only one
argument for textualism, it is a particularly important one.389 Most
arguments for textualism are pragmatic, rooted in a sense that legislative
history is unhelpful or misleading.390 In contrast, the bicameralism and
presentment argument suggests that reliance on legislative history is
impermissible.391 But for courts reviewing local legislation, this uniquely
powerful argument does not apply at all.
Obviously, Article I does not formally bind local governments. It
governs how Congress enacts laws. In a literal sense, Section 7 refers to
the House of Representatives, the Senate and the President; it does not
govern legislative processes generally. The federal constitution does not,
by any argument, forbid the use of legislative history by nonfederal
legislatures.
That said, many sophisticated textualists see the spirit, not the text,
of Article I as barring the use of legislative history. John Manning, for
example, acknowledges that Article I, Section 7 only governs what texts
386. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
387. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1526–27 (1998)
(reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)).
388. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191–92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also In re
Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.)
The Constitution establishes a complex of procedures, including presidential approval (or
support by two-thirds of each house). It would demean the constitutionally prescribed
method of legislating to suppose that its elaborate apparatus for deliberation on, amending,
and approving a text is just a way to create some evidence about the law, while the real
source of legal rules is the mental processes of legislators.
389. Cf. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The greatest defect
of legislative history is its illegitimacy . . . . As the Court said in 1844: ‘The law as it passed is the will
of the majority of both houses . . . .’” (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845)).
390. John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism,
Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES . L. REV. 489, 494 (2001).
391. Id. Moreover, as Victoria Nourse has argued, the stakes of the constitutional argument against
legislative history are high not only for statutory interpretation (itself a central element of the modern
judicial role) but also for constitutional law more broadly. Nourse, supra note 385, at
318–24 (describing issue’s relationship with countermajoritarian difficulty and theories of judicial
review).
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are enacted as law, not how to interpret those texts.392 Since textualists
frequently refer to dictionaries or the common law as interpretive
aids¾and neither are passed through bicameralism¾the argument
against legislative history must go beyond what Article I formally
requires.393 Even so, Manning finds the purpose and function of the
bicameralism requirement important, arguing that bicameralism
promotes caution, deliberation and adversarial debate, while checking
government power and preventing special interest or factional legislation
from being enacted.394 According to Manning and other textualists, the
values underlying bicameralism require avoiding legislative history, even
where the formal requirements of Article I do not.395 Judicial language
from leading textualists like Justice Scalia or Judge Easterbrook likewise
highlights the bicameral process as importantly “difficult” or
“elaborate.”396
For local governments, though, the values of bicameralism are as
immaterial as the formal requirements of Article I. Local government has
not adopted the structure of bicameralism, and it has not adopted
bicameralism’s values. It does not see bicameralism as a necessary block
on special interest legislation and dismisses deliberation in favor of
efficiency. At the state and federal levels, it can be argued that
bicamerally enacted legislative text is more likely to promote the public
interest than single-chamber public history, but at the local level,
everything is single chambered and that is deemed a virtue. Using
legislative history to interpret local legislation may still be unwise, but
there is nothing in the federal constitution suggesting as much.397

392. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 71–72
(2001).
393. Id.
394. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 708–10
(1997) (“To appreciate the importance of adopting interpretive rules designed to preserve the integrity
of the constitutionally prescribed legislative process, it is helpful to recall the context that gave rise to
the inclusion of bicameralism and presentment in the Constitution.”).
395. But see Eskridge, supra note 388, at 1527 (taking contrary position, that “principle (or spirit)
derived from Article I, Section 7 is unlikely to support the new textualism”).
396. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191–92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); In
re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343–44 (7th Cir. 1989).
397. Some pragmatic arguments against the use of legislative history may also be inapplicable in
the local context. For example, textualists deny the possibility of discerning collective intent from a
multimember legislature. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. R EV. 533,
546 (1983). Local legislatures, unlike Congress or state legislatures, can more plausibly speak in one
voice, since they are comprised of only one chamber, and usually a small one at that. There is a
dramatically smaller gap between the positions of a single member of a local legislature¾who after all
may be one of three or five total members¾and the intent of the legislature as a whole. But others,
such as the manipulability of legislative history by lawmakers or judges, see Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005), or the high cost to litigants of legislative history
research, cf. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State,
the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 380–81 (2013)
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The overall force of this argument depends, of course, on one’s prior
position on legislative history. It rebuts only one argument against
legislative history: a committed textualist will still find reason to oppose
its use, even in interpreting local legislation. Even so, the fact of local
unicameralism should influence statutory interpretation, at least on the
margin. The constitutionally inspired arguments against legislative
history do not apply to local ordinances. Judges should apply a lighter
touch with their textualism in the local context and in particular, should
eschew interpretive methodologies that make no allowance for the
profound differences in legislative structure at the local level.398
Local unicameralism should also have wider repercussions on the
interpretation of local legislation, beyond the specific technique of using
legislative history, although the direction of those repercussions may be
less clear. Take, for example, the public choice-inspired debate over how
statutory interpretation can best promote the public interest, as opposed
to special interests. Jonathan Macey has argued that because the
bicameral structure of Congress makes Congress more difficult for
narrow factions to capture, it promotes “public-regarding” legislation.399
He therefore endorses traditional, holistic approaches to statutory
interpretation.400 William Eskridge, however, cites the same public
choice scholars but reaches a quite different conclusion.401 For Eskridge,
bicameralism is a hurdle that intensely focused special interests can clear
but
which
can
trip
up
diffusely
supported
general-interest legislation.402 He would interpret statutes with
asymmetrical benefits and burdens narrowly or broadly, as needed, to
compensate for the structural effects of bicameralism.403

(identifying federal government and elite Washington lawyers as specially able to wield legislative
history arguments).
Moreover, attempts to use local legislative history will pose their own special challenges,
particularly the limited volume and low quality of the legislative history that may exist locally.
Briffault, supra note 23, at 25 (noting that many local legislatures lack committee reports or reports
on floor debates). Whether these challenges can or should be overcome is a complicated question¾but
not one to which the federal constitution or common textualist arguments speak.
398. State courts, in particular, tend to apply fixed methodological approaches. See Abbe R. Gluck,
The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New
Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754 (2010). These methodologies do not make allowances
for the state/local distinction. See, e.g., Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d
1143, 1146–47 (Or. 1993) (mandating approach for “interpreting a statute” generally).
399. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 247–48 (1986).
400. Id. at 227.
401. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory
for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 291 (1988).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 323–24.
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Both Macey and Eskridge (and the many scholars working in a
public choice tradition since)404 extract entire theories of statutory
interpretation from their analysis of the legislative process. But when
that
process
changes¾such
as
from
bicameralism
to
unicameralism¾their theories must change as well. Because the
implications of public choice scholarship for statutory interpretation are
not settled¾and are not likely to be settled any time soon¾local
unicameralism is a fact that can cut many ways.
One might hypothesize that local ordinances should be interpreted
more purposively. To the extent that local government is less deliberative
and more reactive, could its enactments all be seen as akin to remedial
legislation, which should be interpreted broadly?405 Arguably, if local
legislation is generally a quick-and-dirty attempt to fix a nagging
problem, courts should be more willing to partner with the legislature
and help secure the legislation’s goals. Or, because local government can
more easily amend its legislation, perhaps courts could be less afraid of a
proactive, but erroneous, interpretation.406 Given how little can be stated
decisively about how structure affects lawmaking, though, particularly at
the understudy local level, these must remain only hypotheses.
Still, any interpretive methodology based on an empirical
understanding of the legislative process must account for the empirical
reality that local legislatures are not like state or federal legislatures.407
Indeed, they have been consciously designed to diverge from the federal
model. Yet process-sensitive theories of statutory interpretation,
developed with an eye toward Congressional structure, are blindly
applied to the acts of quite different city councils or county commissions.
Ours is a tripartite system of government¾federal, state, and local¾and
legislatively, one of those levels is not like the others. This Article
provides a first step in the difficult work408 of developing a new approach
404. See generally MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009).
405. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[W]e are guided by the familiar canon
of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its
purposes.”).
406. This could support even stronger principles of stare decisis when interpreting local
legislation. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972).
407. This describes many, but not all, theories of statutory interpretation. Judge Posner’s blunt
realism stands out in this regard. See RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE
JUDICIARY 1–2 (2016) (endorsing position that judges take the position “that would prevail if resort to
traditional legal materials were disallowed”).
408. Recently, scholars have turned their attention to unpacking the messy details of Congressional
process in order to refine statutory interpretation. See generally Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside¾An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R.
Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside¾An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S.
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575
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to interpretation that acknowledges the unicameral local legislative
process¾with its strengths and its weaknesses¾that we have chosen.409
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LOCAL MAJORITARIANISM
Statutory interpretation is not the only judicial task affected by local
unicameralism. Judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation
must also adapt to the unique qualities of local legislative structure.
Theories of judicial review are inherently theories about the
interrelationship of courts and legislatures, about their respective
strengths, weaknesses, and perhaps most importantly, their charges
within
a
given
constitutional
structure.410
Different
legislatures¾reflecting different visions of good governance¾should be
reviewed differently. Moreover, the debates over judicial review are
plagued by the “countermajoritarian difficulty.”411 Local legislatures are,
by design, dramatically more majoritarian than Congress. Whatever
uneasy conclusions about majoritarianism have been reached for judicial
review of state and national legislation, they cannot hold at the local level.
Local unicameralism demands its own jurisprudence. In this Subpart, I
briefly set forth one tentative vision for an institutionally aware, localist
judicial review: A hands-off approach to most local legislation, meant to
support local experimentation and initiative, paired with tougher judicial
scrutiny of legislation affecting certain minorities.
Many of the most prominent theories of judicial review draw
inspiration and legal grounding from the structure of government set
forth in the Constitution.412 Take, for example, John Hart Ely’s

(2002). These scholars distinguish between types of legislative history, finding some more reliable
than others, and wade into the details of “unorthodox lawmaking.” BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX
LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (5th ed. 2017). The same work may
need to be done anew at the local level¾but across tens of thousands of governments, each with their
own institutions and their own traditions.
409. One fascinating avenue of inquiry would be the value of time in the local legislative process.
Frank Easterbrook identified “lack of time as a vital ingredient” in the legislative process, noting that
even popular bills often fail to be enacted because the clock runs out before Congress can act.
Easterbrook, supra note 397, at 539. Based on this, Easterbrook argues that post-enactment legislative
action (short of amendment) should not affect the interpretation of a statute. Id. In unicameral local
legislatures, which are designed to pass bills with greater efficiency and less deliberation, the
ingredient of “time” may (or may not) have substantially different meaning.
410. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1361–64 (2006) (describing assumptions about legislative and judicial institutions on which his
philosophical case against judicial review relies).
411. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1014 (1984) (describing countermajoritarian difficulty as “the starting point for contemporary analysis
of judicial review”).
412. Many theories of judicial review, of course, do not. Certain forms of textualism and
originalism reject this sort of structural argument, for example. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,
112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 788–89 (1999) (discussing how both “plain-meaning” and “original intent”
textualists are each “clause-bound”). Bruce Ackerman has forcefully argued that process and
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“representation-reinforcing” theory of judicial review,413 as influential a
vision as any in legal scholarship.414 Ely laid out a two-step analysis. He
first looked to the structure of the Constitution, from one-off clauses415
to overall legislative design,416 to find its “pervasive strategy,” which he
believed to be a pluralist guarantee that no one faction could uniformly
dominate others.417 He then offered a method for judicial intervention to
correct failures in that strategy: in his case, by protecting political
dissidents or racial minorities shut out of pluralist bargaining.418 Under
Ely’s approach¾or any other theory of judicial review rooted in
constitutional structure¾the judge’s role is to further the particular
brand of self-government put forward by the Constitution.
Bicameralism is a central structural feature of the federal
Constitution, and as might be expected, it plays a prominent role in
structuralist theories of judicial review. Cass Sunstein, for example, has
identified bicameralism as an embodiment of “the central republican
understanding that disagreement can be a creative force” and an effort to
create a “constitutional framework” of “deliberative democracy.”419 For
Sunstein, the Constitution’s wide distribution of power¾within the
legislature, across branches, and between the states and federal
government¾forces politicians to work through disagreement and gain
substance cannot be disentangled, as Ely and others would have it. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718–19 (1985). One might believe that judges should be
counter-majoritarian or majoritarian on principle, regardless of how citizens opt to structure their
legislatures. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term¾Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989) (describing history of majoritarianism and countermajoritarianism in constitutional law). Local unicameralism will have different effects on different
theories of judicial review, and in some is likely to prove entirely immaterial. What I to hope
demonstrate, though, is that theories of judicial review cannot be mechanically carried over from the
state or federal context to the local; local unicameralism is so fundamental a difference in legislative
process that it must be taken into account.
413. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 88 (1980).
414. Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory,
77 VA. L. REV. 721, 721 (1991) (“Few, if any, books have had the impact on constitutional theory of John
Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust.”).
415. ELY, supra note 413, at 90 (Ex Post Facto Clause); ELY, supra note 414, at 96 (Takings Clause).
416. ELY, supra note 413, at 90.
417. ELY, supra note 413, at 80. Ely of course marshals other arguments for his representationreinforcing vision of judicial review. In particular, he points to the “underlying premises of the
American system of representative democracy” and the core competencies of the judiciary. ELY, supra
note 413, at 88. The “underlying premises” of the American system are, like the structure of
government, different at the local level than at the national level. The competencies of the judiciary
may be the same.
418. ELY, supra note 413, at 102–03 (recommending that constitutional adjudication intervene in
the political process only:
when the process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of
political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no
one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are
systematically disadvantaging some minority . . . .
419. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1562.
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the benefits of competition, debate and dissent.420 Then, having found
civic republicanism (and not only individualistic liberalism) to drive the
Constitutional vision of government, Sunstein argues courts should be
friendly to federalism, support campaign finance regulation, loosen
Establishment Clause limits on religious organization, inspect the
rationality of statutes, and adopt antisubordination conceptions of equal
protection.421
Subsequent civic republicans have likewise identified bicameralism
as a foundation for their constitutional vision. That vision can take many
forms. Bicameralism has been used to support, on the one hand, an
expansion of judicial power into overseeing the legislative process (rather
than only outcomes),422 and, on the other hand, a broadside against the
constitutionality of “expansive judicial power.”423 Civic republicans John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport argue that “the central principle
underlying the Constitution is governance through supermajority rules,”
one of which is the bicameralist structure of Congress.424 They conclude
that this principle requires textualist and originalist approaches to
judicial review, to ensure that judicial decisionmaking does not usurp the
broad consensus required for supermajority enactments.425
Nor are civic republicans the only ones to summon bicameralism in
support of their constitutional vision. Many scholars see bicameralism as
part of a distinctly libertarian constitutional vision.426 A very deep
literature analyzes whether plebiscites ought to be subject to special
judicial scrutiny due to their deviations from the standard legislative
model¾including their lack of a bicameral check¾and scholars come
out both ways.427 The list could go on. This brief and entirely
420. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1562.
421. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1576–81. For a description of the “anti-subordination” vision of
the Equal Protection Clause, see generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004).
422. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process,
91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1934–35 (2011).
423. Jack Wade Nowlin, The Constitutional Illegitimacy of Expansive Judicial Power: A Populist
Structural Interpretive Analysis, 89 KY. L.J. 387, 412–13 (2000–2001).
424. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 703, 705 (2002).
425. Id. at 802–05.
426. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2386–87 n.1474 (2002) (“The
purpose of the federalist structure, the national separation of powers, and the bicameralism and
presentment requirements for lawmaking are largely libertarian.”); Gillian Metzger, Michael Greve’s
The Upside Down Constitution: Parasitic Federalism and the Ambiguities of Constitutional
Structure, BALKINIZATION (June 17, 2013), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/michael-grevesupside-down-constitution.html (describing bicameralism as supporting claim that the federal
Constitution establishes a system of “competitive federalism”).
427. See, e.g., Robin Charlow, Judicial Review Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 547 (1994); Eule, supra note 180, at 1584 (“[W]hen the state departs from the
vision reflected in each of the first three Articles¾a bicameral legislative body, an executive with the
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non-exhaustive review of the relationship between bicameralism and
judicial review is not meant to survey the field or to prove any particular
case. It is meant only to illustrate that, across issue area and across
ideologies, scholars turn to the structure of the Constitution generally,
and the fact of bicameralism specifically, to root their theories of judicial
review. Put simply, bicameralism is a big deal for judicial review.
But despite the prevalence of unicameralism at the local level, there
is no equivalent literature on the implications of unicameralism for
judicial review. In the American context,428 the closest article addresses
the state level, and expressly disclaims any applicability to local
government. James Rogers has argued for special standards of judicial
review for Nebraska’s unicameral state legislature, specifically arguing
that courts should apply stricter scrutiny to unicameral legislative
enactments.429 Bicameralism, he asserts, provides a check against
factional legislation and introduces more empirical information to the
overall legislative process.430 Rogers therefore concludes that “there
must be an increase in the rigor of judicial review to substitute for the
loss of legislative review otherwise accorded by second chambers.”431
Whatever the merits of Rogers’ argument¾and there are reasons to be
skeptical of his positive claims432¾it does not apply to local
governments, as he freely admits. Rogers essentially argues that two
heads are better than one, and local governments are already overseen
by the states.433
What is missing, therefore, is a theory of judicial review that
accounts for local unicameralism. As Clayton Gillette has observed,
“[v]irtually the entire literature that assesses judicial interpretation

power to veto, and an independent judiciary . . . Federal court invocation of the Bill of Rights . . . may
well be the only line of defense against majoritarian tyranny.”); Baker, supra note 50, at 716 (arguing
that despite differences between plebiscitary and legislative lawmaking, including bicameralism as the
“most obvious difference[]”).
428. This Article does not look comparatively at other countries where unicameral legislatures are
common at the national or state/provincial level. See, e.g., Dinan, supra note 211, at 857–58
(discussing common pattern among federations of bicameral national legislature and unicameral state
legislatures, as well as exceptions). For now, I proceed one institutional variable at a time.
429. Rogers, supra note 187, at 66.
430. Rogers, supra note 187, at 96, 99.
431. Rogers, supra note 187, at 110. Rogers also notes that historically, Nebraska’s unicameral
legislature emerged during the tail end of the Lochner era and its proponents expressly understood
the judiciary to be taking such an active role. Rogers, supra note 187, at 79–80.
432. For example, it seems implausible that the upper and lower chambers of a legislature would
have access to different empirical information, given both modern information technology and
political polarization. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006). And, as noted, supra notes 400–04 and accompanying text, it is not
clear whether bicameralism empowers or disempowers special interests.
433. Rogers, supra note 430, at 107 n.140 (“[E]ven though the legislative authority of local
governments is typically exercised by a unicameral assembly . . . . [T]heir legislative powers and
decisions are already subject to state legislative oversight.”).

KAZIS-69.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

May 2018]

5/26/18 12:49 PM

AMERICAN UNICAMERALISM

1219

comprises debates about the appropriate scope of federal court
intervention into federal legislation.”434 Gillette himself has gone a long
way to filling this gap. His book Local Redistribution and Local
Democracy¾ostensibly about the narrow question of when local
governments should be allowed to redistribute income¾weaves together
everything from state constitutional law to urban public choice theory
and produces an entirely novel argument for how state judges should
police the line between local and state authority.435 My aim is to provide
another brick in that wall, offering a hypothesis of how unicameralism
fits into theories of judicial review of local action.
Based upon this Article’s analysis of local unicameralism, I conclude
that process-conscious courts should be more accommodating of local
legislation and¾with an important exception¾subject it to less scrutiny.
Local governments turned to unicameralism in order to make their
legislative processes more efficient, nimble, and responsive. To the extent
that judicial review should reflect structural constitutional choices,
courts ought to honor and support those goals of efficiency. Secondguessing¾by an upper chamber or a reviewing court¾is not what the
designers of local government had in mind when they installed
unicameralism.436 In the local vision of democracy, the proper protection
against bad legislation is a subsequent majority quickly and easily
repealing the law, not roadblocks to the law’s enactment in the first place.
Courts attempting to match their review of legislation to the process by
which that legislation is passed should look positively on local initiative
and loosen judicial strictures on local legislation.437
At the same time, local unicameralism has a darker side, one that
triggers the countermajoritarian role of the judiciary. Local
unicameralism is also rooted in the confidence of majorities in their own
ability to protect themselves even at the expense of minorities. Popular
comfort with unicameralism at the local level depends on an assumption
that “people like me” will be in charge and stay in charge¾hence the
strength of unicameralism in homogeneous, homevoter-dominated
434. GILLETTE, supra note 50, at 109.
435. See generally GILLETTE, supra note 50.
436. Of course, local government is hemmed in by all sorts of legal restrictions. See FRUG &
BARRON, supra note 220, at 1–4. Indeed, many of the same individuals pushing for local
unicameralism were good government Progressives who were highly skeptical of local power, which
they saw as generally used in service of corrupt aims; these were not strong home rule advocates. See,
e.g., Barron, supra note 279, at 2285–86. My claim is only that all else being equal, local
unicameralism cuts in one direction: toward lighter judicial scrutiny of local ordinances.
437. There are many affinities between this conclusion and the literature on “experimentalism” in
government, which emphasizes the role of local governments in national governance and the need for
policy innovation. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); cf. David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution:
Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 549–59
(2008) (summarizing, and critiquing, experimentalist literature).
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suburbs. For those shut out, the argument for judicial deference turns on
its head. When majorities trample on distinct minorities shut out of the
permanent homevoter coalition, local unicameralism offers courts a
justification for greater scrutiny: the democratic processes have been
designed to ignore minority voice, leaving the courts as the only
institution well-positioned to vindicate minority rights.
Doctrinally, courts could potentially root this heightened scrutiny in
prohibitions on animus-based lawmaking.438 A unicameral legislature
can react more swiftly, or even impulsively, and with a more unified
purpose, than a bicameral body. Thus, when a law targets a local
minority, courts should be more willing to find that law a product of
impermissible animus, rather than a legitimate policy outcome with
winners and losers. Indeed, courts may already engage in this kind of
reasoning implicitly.439
Likewise, when mobility is restricted (for example, by exclusionary
land use policies or other forms of housing discrimination), some groups
are denied the protections of Tiebout competition on which local
unicameralism rests. Judges should step in: groups denied all the
benefits of majoritarianism should not be obligated to bear all its costs.
In a sense, local unicameralism supercharges the Ely approach to
judicial review. Local constitutional structure shows a greater demand
for the quick translation of majority preferences into policy—a
constitutional vision which judges should normally help instantiate¾but
heightens the fear that certain groups will be shut out altogether.
In many ways, this approach to local legislation is already a popular
instinct. Local government boosters praise its ability to innovate.440
Opponents see it as exclusionary.441 Both groups see local legislation as
basically efficacious¾whether banning smoking442 or harassing the
homeless,443 local governments are understood as getting the job done.
Foregrounding unicameralism helps build a framework for better
understanding these twin features of local government. Local
government is, by its very design, aggressively majoritarian, warts and
438. See Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV.
183 (2013); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012).
439. Compare Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–42
(1993), with Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 593–601 (4th Cir. 2017)
(espousing different attitudes toward ability to infer intent and animus of local versus federal
governments).
440. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL NATIONS,
RISING CITIES 3–8 (2013); BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: HOW
CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 1–5 (2013).
441. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 352, at 1870–74.
442. See Diller, supra note 49, at 1225–36.
443. See Anthony D. Lauriello, Panhandling Regulation After Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
116 COLUM. L. REV. 1105, 1118–23 (2016) (describing local efforts to limit where and how panhandling
can take place).
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all. Judicial review of local legislation should conform to that
hyper-majoritarianism, bending to its benefits and challenging its
abuses.
CONCLUSION
By drafting a constitution outlining the structure of a national
government, the Framers put forward a vision for American democracy.
Local government has its own constitutional arrangements
¾unicameralism included¾and its own constitutional vision. That
vision imagines the legislature as resolutely majoritarian, streamlined
and efficient, an instrument for translating resident demands into policy.
The executive branch sits at the center of this constitutional vision, which
in turns requires unifying the legislature to serve as a counterweight.
This local constitutional vision is not an alternative to federal
constitutionalism. Rather, it is embedded in an integrated, national
constitutional order where each level of government has its own part to
play. Local government structure reflects the pressures of state and
federal oversight, the push and pull of Tiebout competition, and the
demands of overseeing bureaucracies that must deliver service
block by block. In response, local government has developed into
something all its own: different not just in size or subordinate status, but
in structure.
Like any other constitutionalism, local government’s particular
vision is multifaceted and even self-contradictory. Local unicameralism
demonstrates the immense trust that many Americans hold in their local
legislatures,444 which they empower to act without check or balance. But
that trust is earned in part because local governments have been
impaired by the states and boxed in by competition with each other. Local
unicameralism is the product of local power and local powerlessness,
held
in
tension.
Likewise,
local
unicameralism
is
hyper-democratic on the one hand. But on the other, it reflects local
governments’ formal status, and sometimes practical operation, as little
more than administrative agencies: not sites of culturally rich self-rule
but of cold instrumentalism. Moreover, these contradictions are played
out not once, as with the national constitution, but in tens of thousands
of individual contexts: large cities and small towns, rural counties and
specialized single-purpose districts, each one different. We have
contested the meaning of the national constitution since its enactment;
settling the meaning of our local constitutions will not prove any more
straightforward.
444. Cf. State Governments Viewed Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low, PEW RES. CTR.
(Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/15/state-govermnents-viewed-favorably-asfederal-rating-hits-new-low/ (polls find local government rated more favorably than either state or
federal government).
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Even so, understanding local government requires appreciating its
distinct constitutional vision, whatever it might be, and rooting that
vision in the details of local structure. Citizens voting in referenda,
neighborhood activists on charter reform committees, state legislators
passing incorporation statutes: all have chosen different institutions of
self-governance for the local level. And every day, around the country,
the members of our unicameral legislatures¾city councilors, county
commissioners, school board members, trustees, freeholders, aldermen,
supervisors, and all the rest¾take on those challenges of
self-governance. It is time for courts and scholars alike to recognize that
their unicameralism is every bit as much a part of the American
constitutional order as Congress’s two chambers.
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